M. le Président,
Excellences Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres du Conseil,

Le rapport du Secrétaire Général qui vous est soumis fait le point de la situation dans la République Démocratique du Congo et des activités de la MONUC. Les Forces Armées de la RDC ont fait des progrès dans leurs opérations contre les groupes armés étrangers, et en particulier contre les FDLR qui ont été repoussés de la plupart des zones habitées et qui se trouvent dispersés et affaiblis. L’intégration des groupes armés Congolais se poursuit. Les personnes déplacées et les réfugiés sont en train de rentrer chez eux.

Néanmoins, des risques et menaces sérieux persistent et nous devrions éviter toute complaisance. Les FDLR ont été dispersées mais pas encore neutralisées; des attaques menées par des hommes armées continuent au travers les deux provinces du Kivu et dans la province l’Orientale ou des éléments résiduels de la RLA montent des raides sporadiques; le retour des personnes déplacées et des réfugiés, souvent après des années d’absence, provoque des tensions ethniques et des conflits fonciers. La violence sexuelle continue et représente un défi énorme. Et le retour de la sécurité a augmenté les attentes de la population, qui veut maintenant voir un réel ‘dividende de la paix’.

Mr. President,
Distinguished Members of the Council,

A year ago when I spoke to this Council the DRC was faced with a security crisis of grave dimensions following the resumption of hostilities with the CNDP. A year on, there is now a real prospect that the conflicts that have long blighted the eastern Congo can be ended. There has been progress on a number of fronts:

- FARDC operations in the Kivus and in Orientale province have significantly eroded the strike capacity and domination of the FDLR and the LRA.

- Since the beginning of the year, 1,126 FDLR combatants and 1,622 dependents have been repatriated by the DDRRR team. This is more than double the repatriation rate for the same period last year. An additional 11,383 Rwandan civilians, many of whom had been held hostage by the FDLR, returned to Rwanda with the assistance of UNHCR.

- Two major figures wanted by the ICTR for their involvement in the Rwanda genocide have been arrested and transferred to Arusha.

- Most of the IDPs who had been regrouped in camps at the outskirts of Goma as a consequence of the earlier conflict with the CNDP returned home, although there is still a very high number of displaced people in North and South Kivu who are waiting for further improvements in the security situation before going back to their villages.

- More than 2,000 children have been separated from armed groups since the beginning of the year.

- The integration of the CNDP and other Congolese armed groups is approaching completion. Over 120 political prisoners have been recently released and returned to the East with MONUC’s assistance.

- The stabilization programme is moving into areas freed from the control of armed groups and opening the way for the return of state authority.

Despite these positive developments I do not want to imply that the troubles of eastern Congo are a thing of the past. The fast-track integration of up to 20,000 elements of former armed groups, some with a very bad human rights record, into the FARDC has aggravated existing problems of indiscipline and crimes committed against the population. Civilians in remote areas continue to suffer reprisals from the FDLR. There have been new populations displacement and human rights violations, and there is still an appallingly high level of violence against women. Large numbers of people still remain displaced and difficult to access especially during periods of combat. The implementation of the 23 March agreements with the armed groups has been slower than we would have wished.

Looking ahead we see several issues that must be addressed if the momentum generated by the DRC-Rwanda agreements of December 2008 and the 23 March agreements is to be maintained.

First, the areas cleared of FDLR presence by the FARDC must be fully secured to ensure continuing protection for the population and to allow IDPs to return home.

Second, major operations against the remaining FDLR strongholds should be completed as soon as possible with proper regard for the protection of civilians.

Third, in areas that have been secured the stabilization effort must be accelerated giving priority to the control of mining sites to deprive armed elements of revenue backed up by the deployment of armed police and the reconstruction of roads and administrative infrastructure.

Fourth, non-military initiatives designed to encourage defections and surrenders among the remaining FDLR combatants have to be further intensified.

Finally, the discipline of the FARDC and the PNC, which is itself a vital dimension of protection, requires constant attention to signal that impunity will not be accepted.

Mr President,

How will MONUC address these concerns ?

The Council has directed that we focus our attention on protection. We have identified protection hot spots. Last year we launched mobile operating bases (MOBs) so we could respond more flexibly to the rapidly changing military environment. MONUC military is now present in more than 50 different locations throughout the Kivus and in five locations in LRA-affected areas of north-eastern DRC.

As you aware we have created Joint Protection Teams (JPTs), which are deployed into security-sensitive areas to assist the military as well as local authorities to analyse, anticipate, and respond to specific threats against civilians. More than 50 JPT missions have been launched in North and South Kivu, and we have started expanding this practice to the remaining areas of instability in Province Orientale. Deployment of these missions is guided by a Rapid Response and Early Warning Cell that draws on information from a variety of sources, including civil society and surveillance networks established by the military at provincial level.

We are also using these mechanisms to monitor the performance of individual FARDC battalions and asking the Congo’s military leadership to take corrective measures when we see disciplinary problems.

President Kabila has declared “zero tolerance” for acts of sexual and gender based violence and the Government is now acting against looting, corruption and other undisciplined behaviour in the armed forces. The five commanders who were identified by the Security Council have all been removed from command and will be prosecuted; two are already under arrest, two more have been put under house arrest in Kinshasa, and the last one has absconded. The FARDC has established a military court for the Kivus, which has handed down more than 30 sentences on soldiers found guilty of serious crimes. High-level commanders have been relieved of their duties for misconduct, including the embezzlement of funds. The refurbishment of Ndolo Military Prison, in Kinshasa is nearly complete and staff has been trained thanks to funding provided by the Netherlands. This will enable the transfer of serious offenders from the Eastern DRC to Kinshasa. MONUC is establishing Prosecution Support Cells (PSCs) to assist Congolese authorities in investigating and prosecuting serious crimes, including rape. Partner assistance is critical to this initiative..

To underscore MONUC’s full support for the President’s zero tolerance policy and to reinforce that policy, MONUC will withdraw support from battalions that show a blatant disregard for international humanitarian law.

MONUC is the first mission in which the Force Commander has issued a specific directive on civilian protection to all contingents. Under that directive, MONUC blue helmets provide protection against attacks by the FDLR and other armed elements and patrol key axes to facilitate the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. On market days, peacekeepers provide armed escorts so that villagers can travel to and from the marketplace without fear of harassment and illegal taxation by armed groups. The blue helmets also support the rehabilitation of schools, administrative buildings, roads and bridges.

All of these activities have been integrated into a comprehensive civilian protection strategy developed by MONUC and the Protection Cluster.

Our protection efforts are a daily exercise in managing scarce resources and making hard choices. The Council is well aware of the strain on MONUC’s military and logistical assets. I must pay tribute to the military contingents and to the civilian personnel who are working to project MONUC’s presence into very demanding terrain. In the past few weeks, the first elements of the additional 3,000 uniformed personnel the Council authorized last year have begun to arrive in theatre and are being deployed exclusively in the East to further extend and reinforce our protection capacity. Another battalion is also being transferred from Kinshasa to Orientale to backstop the operations against the LRA. With this transfer only 500 UN troops will be left in the entire western area of the DRC. Unfortunately the limited helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft capacity is still a huge constraint on our ability to quickly deploy and sustain MONUC forces in places where they are most needed.

Mr President,

Despite the efforts made by the FARDC and MONUC to improve and extend protection, it is obviously not possible to protect everyone, everywhere, all of the time in the Kivus, an area the size of California with a population of 8 million. So, inevitably, the question arises: should Kimia II be halted?

Some observers have suggested that Kimia II operations should be suspended in order to give the FARDC time to “get its house in order” and improve discipline. We believe, however, that reducing the pressure now would give the FDLR time to regroup and rearm. It would also send an ambiguous message to some elements of the FARDC who have in the past cooperated with the FDLR. Suspension at this time would therefore undermine the FARDC’s resolve and paradoxically further weaken discipline by removing the immediate pressure for reform created by Kimia II. Rwanda might also see this as a step backwards from the rapprochement that has opened up an entirely new perspective for the Kivus.

A suspension would make it more difficult for the Government to impose State authority and prevent the re-emergence of other armed groups who might well draw the conclusion that attacks against civilians will force the Government to give in to their demands. Above all, a suspension of operation Kimia II would be celebrated as a victory by the FDLR; it would strengthen the ties between the leadership abroad and the combatants on the ground, thus annihilating years of efforts of sensitization aimed at weakening these links.

We do, however, agree that military pressure alone is not enough and should be part of a multi-faceted approach to the FDLR problem that recognizes the need for enhanced measures to protect civilians and other action designed to encourage FDLR defections and the weakening of FDLR support outside of the DRC.

You will recall my earlier appeal for countries hosting FDLR leaders abroad to take legal action to neutralise their influence on the conflict. Your commitment and cooperation in this regard are particularly important. FDLR leaders abroad have sustained a propaganda campaign against operation Kimia II, discouraging rank-and-file combatants from surrendering. Additional pressure must be brought to bear on exiled leaders to change their attitude, or sever their communications with combatants on the ground.

MONUC has proposed that the Congolese Government and host countries of FDLR leaders in exile explore the possibility of criminalizing the FDLR under the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime. There is overwhelming evidence of crimes in the Kivus and if this initiative gained international support, it could also serve as a powerful disincentive to those involved in illegal trading networks with the FDLR.

Mr President,

Allow me to report briefly on the integration of Congolese armed groups into the national army. More and more remnant groups are joining this process. They have been motivated by a combination of military pressure and dialogue. Although the official integration process is over, the FARDC continues to receive and to integrate those who surrender. At the same time, the Army hierarchy is improving the conditions of service for newly integrated soldiers although the timely payment of salaries is still a major problem that needs to be resolved urgently. In the framework of the Stabilization Programme barracks are being constructed with assistance from the UK and the Netherlands. A MONUC programme for newly integrated troops will start in January at two of three planned training centres with the support of training specialists from the Tanzanian army.

These activities are intended to consolidate military integration and improve the discipline and efficiency of the FARDC. They are also the first steps towards army reform, which in itself is an important long-term project that will require substantial international support. The Conseil Supérieur de la Défense has endorsed an army reform plan that has been submitted to Parliament for review. The Minister of Defence will discuss its implementation with international partners once parliamentary approval has been obtained.

MONUC has worked with the mediation led by Presidents Obasanjo and Mkapa to follow-up on the 23 March agreements. As already mentioned, we have assisted with the release of former CNDP prisoners. We are mobilizing resources for the war wounded and for a training programme for the integrated police units. We shall also continue to press for a solution to the territorial administration in areas where ex-CNDP cadres still retain control on the ground. We will continue to work with all concerned to ensure that the commitment to the 23 March agreements does not falter.

Mr President,

Because of time constraints I will not discuss a number of other areas of concern and activity for MONUC. Let me mention, however, the local elections. Despite assurances from the Government that local elections will be held before the general elections in mid 2011, the timetable and dates for these elections have not yet been announced and may well be pushed back again until late 2010; also the necessary enabling legislation has yet to be adopted by the legislature.

The report of the Secretary General also mentions the dismissal of a large number of magistrates. There is concern regarding the establishment of mechanisms to ensure judicial independence and accountability, including the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature (CSM). Current tensions regarding the respective roles of the CSM and the Ministry of Justice and the paucity of budgetary resources are impediments to progress in establishing an effective justice sector. And as grave as the problem is with regard to the courts, the situation of prisons in the DRC is even more critical. As the current level of national funding renders significant progress impossible, donor resources are urgently required.

Mr President,

In closing, I want to make some observations about MONUC’s mandate, which will be reviewed at the end of the year. Resolution 1856 lists 41 tasks, which have given us considerable flexibility in a rapidly changing environment. However, it has also generated many demands and high expectations that need to be rationalized.

The preparation of an Integrated Strategic Framework, as requested by the Secretary General’s Policy Committee, provides us with an opportunity to reflect on how this might be done. The ISF, which is a joint undertaking of MONUC and the UN country team, will outline the key challenges facing the DRC. It will indicate how the United Nations might assist the country respond to them in a cohesive manner, taking full account of the Government’s own stated priorities and the directives of this Council as regards the focus and deployment of MONUC’s resources. The Integrated Strategy builds on other strategic initiatives developed by the United Nations in the DRC, notably the UN Strategy to combat Sexual Violence, the Strategy on Protection of Civilians, the Stabilization Programme for the East, and the multi-dimensional approach to deal with the FDLR.

The ISF will consider challenges that do not fall directly under the mandate of MONUC but are of direct concern to the wider UN system. Nevertheless, we anticipate that the ISF will highlight issues that should be part of the MONUC mandate review. These will include: the progress of the peace process; security sector reform; protection and the rule of law; conflict prevention and resolution; stabilization in the East; and the democratic process and elections.

We shall also consider the possible structural arrangements required to implement the ISF. In line with your directives MONUC has already deployed 95% of the Mission’s military resources in the East and (outside of the HQ establishment) almost 90 % of the international civilian staff, drawn from all substantive sections.

We have conducted a review of on-going UN operations in the western provinces and identified areas of responsibility that can be transferred to the UN country team with minimal continued support from MONUC.

In October 2008 the Council approved a surge capacity for MONUC, which is under deployment. Assuming that the surge is successful and major military operations against foreign armed groups can be concluded in 2010, MONUC could then begin a phased troop drawdown at a pace consonant with the security situation on the ground. Should the Council so wish this would permit the UN to re-allocate (within a declining overall budget) additional resources to an intensified programme of security sector reform and, more broadly, to the strengthening of the rule of law as a prelude to the eventual departure of the UN peace keeping presence.

In the next report of the Secretary General to the Council we shall present the key elements of the ISF as a contribution to the Council’s review of MONUC’s mandate and the possible reconfiguration of the Mission structure.

In all of the activities I have mentioned, MONUC works closely with Congolese authorities at national and provincial levels. We also work with the Special Envoys of the Secretary-General, with the African Union and the European Union, and with representatives of individual Member States. We value the contribution of EUSEC and EUPOL to Security Sector Reform, as well as support by several Member States to the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy. We are also encouraged by the regional initiative to reactivate the Communauté économique des pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL).

Monsieur le Président,
Distingués Membres du Conseil,

En Novembre, la MONUC va marquer dix ans de présence qui a commencé comme une petite mission d’observateurs et qui a grandi pour devenir la plus grande mission des Nations Unies dans le monde. Au cours de cette décennie, elle a supervisé le cessez-le-feu et le retrait des troupes étrangères, stabilisé la situation sécuritaire, accompagné le dialogue inter-Congolais et la transition, démobilisé les groupes armés en Ituri et ailleurs, facilité les premières élections libres et transparentes depuis 40 ans, et aidé le Gouvernement à gérer la crise dans les Kivus et à mener des opérations contre des groupes armés. Nous sommes fiers d’avoir accompagné le pays à travers ce processus de paix, qui a connu bien de revers et de péripéties. Mais il reste que certains objectifs fondamentaux de l’Accord Inclusif et Global de Sun City – et qui fondent la présence de la MONUC en RDC - sont encore a atteindre, à savoir, la formation d’une armée professionnelle républicaine, la restauration de l’autorité de l’Etat partout, la réconciliation nationale, et l’achèvement de la reconstruction effective du pays.

Toutefois, je suis convaincu que ces tâches concomitantes à celles de la stabilisation et de la pacification doivent se poursuivre, avec le soutien de la MONUC et votre soutien, matériel et diplomatique.

Je vous remercie de votre attention.