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English  |  français 20:43:19, Thursday, 02 Sep 2010
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MONUC's Force Commander briefs the media on the complexities of MONUC's mission


Kinshasa, 12 November 2009 -
The following are extracts from question time following a comprehensive briefing to the Kinshasa press during the weekly MONUC press conference yesterday by MONUC Force Commander General Babacar Gaye. Issues raised included: security in Ituri; MONUC’s suspension of support to a battalion of the 213th brigade of the FARDC; allegations in the New Times (Kigali) of MONUC medical support to FDLR Commander Mudacumura; the future of the Kimia II operation and the time frame for ending it; MONUC’s heavy Asian troop composition; the APCLS and establishment of a MONUC base at Lukweti; and recent clashes in Fizi.


Q: A journalist referred to what he termed “growing insecurity” in Ituri, citing the recent killing of a well-known clergyman and the insecurity created by demobilized combatants who had been “abandoned”. He asked what MONUC was doing in the region and made an observation that armed groups were resurfacing.

General Gaye responded:

About three weeks ago, I went to Bunia, where, I could talk to all the players on-site. From our side, we were very conscious that, despite all the progress that has been made in Ituri, we were witnessing a resurgence of violence in Ituri, especially when we saw about fifty men, only thirty of whom were armed, attack and loot the village of Gety.

Recommendations came out of these consultations, including to our troops. First, we concluded that the Ituri Pacification Commission needed to be more active. This is the responsibility of the Congolese authorities. We also concluded that humanitarian support was needed and that, to accomplish this, it was necessary that all roads leading to the south of Irumu territory be maintained. We retained an engineering unit to ensure that these roads would be serviceable. Finally, as I've said, we decided to close one of our bases at Kuandroma in order to strengthen our presence in Irumu.

Finally, we also suggested, that whenever abuses occur, there is a legal dimension to it. In short, investigations should be launched immediately so that tomorrow the perpetrators of these abuses can be brought to justice.

So we are aware that there is what appears to be a resurgence in violence in Ituri. But this is not inevitable. I believe that the [Congolese] Chief of Staff, General Etumba, is himself in Bunia or is planning to go there. We all need to rally around the “bedside” of Ituri to prevent it from stepping backwards too much. 


Q: A journalist asked about MONUC’s suspension of support for a battalion of the 213 brigade of the FARDC and whether or not the Mission would suspend such support to other FARDC units. The journalist noted a report that cited the massacre at Shalio, and that Commander Zamulinda was known to be behind it, and that Zammulinda was still in Ngungu.


General Gaye responded: 

With regard to continuing to suspend support, I believe that if we had to multiply suspensions of support to the FARDC, this would not be a good sign because it would mean that the signal we have given—which is not a logistical signal; it’s a political and symbolic signal--has not been heard. Now, we work in partnership with the FARDC. This is not a decision of Mr. Alan Doss, it is the mandate of the Security Council. We must support the FARDC and we must, in this support, lead the FARDC to a state in which such support is provided 100%. 

Therefore, it is a signal that was given. It’s a signal that must be heard. It’s towards this objective that we will strive. We are not in a repressive posture. “[That is] you do not do that, we’re suspending.” No. That’s not the rule of the game. A signal was given and I think the echoes that this suspension has created in the press are very revealing: that it is a matter which is initially much more political and symbolic than it is a logistical matter.

In a separate answer on support to the FARDC, General Gaye added:

If we support the FARDC, it is not to substitute ourselves for the Congolese state. Far from it. It’s because we want to avoid the soldiers, having no other choice, to harass and plunder the people. Therefore, it is to protect populations that we provide support. … [in suspending support] The question is that, quite simply, we wanted to give a signal to say "Warning! There are principles that cannot break, to which we have already drawn your attention.” We didn’t get out of bed one morning and decide to stop the support. Steps were taken before that. 

And we believe that it’s correct that the debate be on the table. From this point of view, we have succeeded. We are discussing this issue today. Certainly something will be done by the FARDC, and already the President’s policy of "zero tolerance" is a response to previous steps that were taken. This support will surely lead the FARDC to strengthen all measures concerning discipline and it will be beneficial. 


With regard to the progress and future of the Kimia II operation against the FDLR, General Gaye responded:


We all agree that the FARDC is an army that is undergoing reconstruction, and we are conscious of the difficulties every passing day. This army under reconstruction nonetheless managed at the end of the Umoja Wetu operation to drive the FDLR out from all the strongholds under their control in North and South Kivu. The military pressure exerted on the FDLR helped to repatriate more than 1,500 combatants. These statistics are not subject to dispute because those repatriated went through DDRRR. The military pressure helped at the same time to put out of action between 500 and 1000 FDLR combatants. This had considerable effects on the ground.

The problem we face now–is that it’s extremely difficult to defeat a guerrilla force one hundred percent which, by essence, avoids confrontation because it knows that in a confrontation it no longer has a safe haven, it would be difficult to secure resupply of weapons and ammunition; so one can easily understand why they refuse direct combat. That is why, following an evaluation, it’s necessary to put in place new modes of action. This is what we are recommending. 

The modes of action will consist in keeping the FDLR far from any source of resupply and therefore cause dissension among them in order to maximize the number of surrenders. Of course, this must be accompanied by actions against the FDLR leadership living abroad, those who are sending messages of resistance to their combatants on the ground. It is encouraging that in this area some progress has been observed in certain countries of the European Union.

Asked about about a time frame for the end of the Kimia II operation, General Gaye responded:

Firstly, about the evaluation of the Kima II operation, there is no agreement yet between the FARDC and us on an exact date for the evaluation. But it is clear that, at the end of the year, the fact that the operation has been conducted since last March, virtually nine months, the fact also that many stakeholders are raising their voices to demand a review of the modes of action, all this, I believe, argues in favour of evaluating the situation. 

We believe that, now that the objectives set have been partly attained, it would be pertinent to evaluate the situation and to see how to adapt it to the mode of action chosen by the FDLR, which is to refuse confrontation, to harass the FARDC and the populations in order to survive. (In fact we need to see) how to adapt our overall modes of action to this. I believe this is the right time.


When asked whether or not he would engage in Kimia II if this were to be done again, General Gaye responded: 

It’s the Council that gives us our mandate; the Security Council gave us the mandate to support the FARDC in eradicating and the forced disarmament of foreign and local armed groups. Therefore, we have no choice. If it was to be done over again, well, we would have to implement our mandate. Now, of course, we are not robots; the Council expects us to understand the situation on the ground and that we will do our best to apply the fundamental principles of the United Nations; that we will not violate these principles and that we will assist the FARDC in establishing sustainable peace and security. This is the difficulty of the mandate. 

This is why everybody is criticizing us, precisely because we are trying to tread the narrow path. We are not simply in a wait-and-see and denouncing position in the name of principles; we are rather trying to advance a process and preserve as best as we can the underlying principles of the United Nations. The fact that everybody is criticizing us is at least an indication that we are not inactive; we are taking action. It is only through action that we will get things done.


Q: A journalist referred to a report in the New Times (Kigali) alleging that MONUC was involved in medical support or the sending of a doctor to FDLR Commander Mudacumura.

General Gaye responded:

On this matter I can give you a very clear answer that is the position of the Special Representative, Alan Doss, and the position of MONUC: We are neither directly nor indirectly involved in this case. That’s all. We are neither directly or indirectly involved in any way with a transfer of doctors, or any support to Mudacumura.


Q: A journalist asked why MONUC had so many troops from Asian countries as compared to troops from other continents.

General Gaye responded: 

Indeed these countries are more eager to participate in peacekeeping operations than others. This is a very important question, I believe, of concern to all member states. When the United Nations calls for Member States to offer troops, as you could notice during the the process of putting in place our reinforcement, everybody was very critical of us, saying that we took more than 10 months to have the first troops on the ground. 

Yet we had to find volunteering States. The States must as well meet both political and technical criteria, set by the United Nations for receiving contributions. I therefore believe that all we can do is to pay tribute to the willingness of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, and I understand that recently DRC Minister Tambwe traveled to Delhi where he thanked India for contributing a brigade that has been doing an excellent job in the field.


Q: When asked about “negotiations” with the APCLS and the establishment of a MONUC base at Lukweti in the face of “hostility of the Mai Mai”, General Gaye reponded:

With regard to the APCLS, we are acting completely within our role; there were confrontations between the FARDC and the APCLS and it's MONUC’s role to return the APCLS to the DDR process. We are therefore not negotiating; we are discussing. We are not negotiating, we are in discussions with APCLS. We are not negotiating anything; we are discussing with and creating the conditions for this group to peacefully join the DDR; and that the zone where APCLS considers itself to be providing protection to the population may be made safe by other means. This is what we are doing.

In response to a question about recent clashes in Fizi, General Gaye said:

In Fizi, we are in a DDR problem that deals with local armed groups. It’s absolutely necessary to recognize that that everything that could be done by the Government has been done. How many times did we launch the DDR programme? At some stage, it was necessary to draw a line under DDR to say, from now on an armed man in this country will be considered an outlaw and the full force of the law will be applied against him. That is what we are unfortunately facing with respect to Fizi; and if can make an appeal, it would be an appeal for reason, so that local armed groups lay down their weapons and join either DDR or community projects.

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