Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

I. Introduction

1. By paragraph 4 of its resolution 1291 (2000) of 24 February 2000, the Security Council authorized the expansion of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to consist of up to 5,537 military personnel and appropriate civilian support staff. The mandate of MONUC is set out in paragraph 7 of that resolution.

2. By paragraph 19 of resolution 1291 (2000), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to provide a report every 60 days to the Council on progress in the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and of that resolution. The present report is submitted in accordance with that request.

II. Political developments

3. During the month of January 2000, the Security Council conducted a series of meetings devoted to Africa. In the final week of the month, the Council discussed the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the participation of several regional Heads of State. These included the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Laurent-Désiré Kabila; the President of Angola, José Eduardo dos Santos; the President of Mozambique, Joaquim Alberto Chissano; the President of Rwanda, Pasteur Bizimungu; the President of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni; the President of Zambia, Frederick J. T. Chiluba; and the President of Zimbabwe, Robert G. Mugabe. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Namibia, Theo-Ben Gurirab, currently President of the General Assembly, also attended. A record of the proceedings of the meeting is contained in document S/PV.4092.

4. On 25 January, I invited the visiting Heads of State and the Foreign Ministers to a meeting at which the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was discussed. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and the neutral facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire, former Head of State of Botswana, also took part, as did the Permanent Representative of the United States of America in his capacity as President of the Security Council, the personal envoy of the Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Chairman of the Joint Military Commission established by the Lusaka Agreement, my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kamel Morjane, and my Special Representative for the Great Lakes region, Berhanu Dinka. Participants were briefed on the concept of operations proposed by the United Nations to assist the parties to carry out the Lusaka Agreement, which was set out in my report to the Council dated 17 January 2000 (S/2000/30). I also conducted separate meetings with all the visiting Heads of State and Foreign Ministers, and with the neutral facilitator.

5. Following preparatory meetings of the Joint Military Commission and the Political Committee, the Heads of State and leaders or senior figures of the Congolese movements met at Lusaka on 23 February 2000 under the chairmanship of President Chiluba. The participants issued a communiqué reaffirming their support for the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement; welcoming the imminent adoption by the Security
Council of resolution 1291 (2000); and establishing a new implementation calendar for the Lusaka process as from 1 March 2000.

6. On 9 April, President dos Santos, the President of Namibia, Sam Nujoma, and President Mugabe met with President Kabila at Kinshasa pursuant to a decision taken during the Namibian independence celebrations in Windhoek. The four Presidents issued a communiqué in which they called upon the United Nations to deploy military observers as soon as possible to prevent a deterioration in the military situation which, it was feared, might lead to large-scale hostilities. The Presidents also called on the neutral facilitator to convene the inter-Congolese dialogue as soon as possible.

7. On 10 April, President Kabila held a special cabinet meeting, which, inter alia, resulted in the issuance of a statement reiterating the Government's support for the inter-Congolese dialogue and containing an invitation to the neutral facilitator to play to the full the role envisaged for him in the Lusaka Agreement by resuming his activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

8. On 14 April, as the present report was being completed, a series of violent explosions devastated Kinshasa airport and caused an unknown number of casualties. It was not possible at the time of writing to determine the cause of the incident. MONUC immediately placed its vehicle fleet at the disposal of the authorities to take the injured to hospital.

III. Follow-up to resolution 1291 (2000) and deployment of the Mission

9. By paragraph 5 of its resolution 1291 (2000), the Security Council decided that the phased deployment of MONUC personnel would be carried out as and if the Secretary-General determined that they would be able to deploy to their assigned locations and carry out their functions in conditions of adequate security and with the cooperation of the parties, and that he had received firm and credible assurances from the parties to that effect, and requested the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed in that regard.

Visit of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

10. Accordingly, at my request, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the other belligerent States and rebel movements in March in order to inform them of the provisions of resolution 1291 (2000) and of the United Nations plans for deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Under-Secretary-General also stressed to the parties the need for their full adherence to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, including its ceasefire provisions, and their cooperation with and support for MONUC in its deployment and operations. In the case of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, he laid great stress on the need for MONUC to enjoy full freedom of movement within the country. Concerns had arisen over this matter since the authorities had refused or delayed the provision of clearances for MONUC aircraft to take off from the airport at Kinshasa.

11. During his visits, the Under-Secretary-General met with the Heads of State of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia, Uganda and Zimbabwe and senior members of their Governments. In Rwanda he met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister in the Office of the President and the chief of military staff. He also met in Rwanda and Uganda with the leaders of and/or senior figures in both wings of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD).

12. Since the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Angola was in New York at that time, he received a briefing from the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. My Special Representative met in Gbadolite with the leader of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), Jean-Pierre Bemba, on 17 March. Later on the same day, Mr. Morjane also met the President of the Central African Republic, Ange-Félix Patassé.

13. All the leaders and senior officials who met with the Under-Secretary-General undertook to extend their full cooperation to the United Nations and to MONUC, to adhere to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and to comply with Security Council resolutions. In Kinshasa, the Under-Secretary-General submitted to the Government a draft status-of-forces agreement, as called for in paragraph 10 of resolution 1291 (2000).
Nonetheless, as described below, developments since the Under-Secretary-General’s visit show that some of the undertakings made to him have not been respected.

14. MONUC has now deployed 111 military officers (see annex). Some of these officers are stationed in the capitals of the belligerent States (Harare, Kampala, Kigali, Kinshasa, Luanda and Windhoek), as well as at Addis Ababa, Bujumbura and Lusaka to ensure liaison with the Joint Military Commission and OAU.

15. Within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, outside the capital, military officers are stationed at 10 locations: Boende, Bunia, Gbadolite, Gemena, Goma, Isiro, Kananga, Kindu, Kisangani and Lisala.

16. Immediately following the visit of the Under-Secretary-General to Kinshasa, a MONUC military and logistical survey team was permitted for the first time to make preliminary visits to Matadi, Mbandaka and Mbuji Mayi. As indicated in my previous report (S/2000/30, para. 68), the concept of operations approved by the Council calls for the deployment of reinforced battalions at Mbandaka, Mbuji Mayi, Kindu and Kisangani. MONUC has had teams stationed at the latter two locations for some time.

17. The use of the seaport at Matadi is also essential to reduce the costs of the MONUC operation as far as possible, since it would permit supplies and equipment to be brought by sea and transported to Kinshasa by rail, from where they could be transported across the country by the extensive inland waterway system, if the parties and the security situation so permit. If not, all deployment and sustainment, including resupply, rotation and medical and casualty evacuation, will have to be effected by air, greatly adding to the cost and risks of the operation.

18. At all three locations (Matadi, Mbandaka and Mbuji Mayi), as well as at Kananga, which the Government suggested as an alternative location to Mbuji Mayi, the team made a preliminary study of the facilities and infrastructure, including the airstrip and the availability of suitable accommodation, fresh water and electricity, and road and river links. While further study will be needed, there are indications that with the full cooperation of the national and local authorities it would be possible to deploy in those locations after the necessary preparations have been made. However, following the departure of the Under-Secretary-General, the authorities again refused to grant MONUC flight clearances between 19 and 22 March, though clearances have since been granted. Nonetheless, it has not yet proved possible for MONUC to pay follow-up visits to Matadi, Mbandaka or Mbuji Mayi to proceed with the necessary reconnaissance and preparations.

19. MONUC will continue its discussions with the Government and other parties in an effort to deploy military liaison officers to a number of locations, pending its full deployment; these include Bukavu and Kalemie in addition to Matadi, Mbandaka and Mbuji Mayi. MONUC would also seek to deploy teams to Kabinda and Kabalo, the sites selected for initial deployment by the Joint Military Commission. There is already a regional Joint Military Commission at Kabinda, but it has not yet been possible to deploy the Joint Military Commission/OAU team to Kabalo. Repeated efforts to co-locate a MONUC team with the Joint Military Commission team at Kabinda have so far failed for a variety of reasons, including outbreaks of fighting in the immediate vicinity.

20. The deployment of MONUC is likely to be affected by the damage caused to the infrastructure at Kinshasa airport. The two MONUC aircraft at the airport at the time of the explosions will remain out of action until they have been thoroughly inspected, and the use of the airport as a major port of entry for MONUC personnel, equipment and supplies may be impaired pending its restoration.

Decisions of the Joint Military Commission and the Political Committee

21. On 4 April, pursuant to a request from MONUC, the Joint Military Commission met at Kampala, inter alia, to discuss a draft plan for the disengagement from confrontation lines of belligerent forces and their redeployment to designated assembly points under MONUC monitoring. The plan was drawn up by MONUC pursuant to paragraph 7 (c) of resolution 1291 (2000). The Joint Military Commission submitted the draft, with minor amendments, to the Political Committee, which met at Kampala immediately afterwards.

22. On 8 April, following detailed scrutiny by the senior military representatives of the parties, the Political Committee adopted the plan. In doing so, the parties agreed to a total cessation of hostilities from 14 April (D-day); the withdrawal of all forces to a
distance of 15 km from the confrontation line; and the
creation of a 30-km wide zone of disengagement. In
accordance with the plan, all parties undertook to
provide a secure environment in the areas under their
control and to facilitate the access of United Nations
personnel and guarantee their freedom of movement.

23. The plan, the implementation of which is to be
verified by MONUC and the Joint Military
Commission, calls for forces to redeploy
simultaneously to new defensive positions in
accordance with an agreed sequence. This will require
MONUC and the Joint Military Commission to draw
up a separate and detailed sub-plan for each area where
troops are engaged, on the basis of additional military
information to be provided by the parties.

24. The plan also comprises a calendar, which
commences with the signing of the plan on 8 April. On
that date, the political leadership of the parties as
represented by the Political Committee issued orders to
their respective military commanders to cease fire. The
Defence Chiefs of each party have agreed to confirm
their receipt of the orders and to provide copies of the
orders to MONUC and the Joint Military Commission.
So far, MONUC has received copies of orders issued
by all parties except MLC.

25. Starting on 21 April, the parties are required to
provide MONUC and the Joint Military Commission
with detailed military information, area by area, so that
the planning for disengagement may be completed.
Thereafter, the withdrawal of the parties will create a
demilitarized zone around the line of confrontation,
followed by sequential verification, zone by zone, by
MONUC observers during the period D+30 to D+86,
I.e., approximately mid-May to mid-July. The plan also
calls for the deployment of MONUC phase II between
mid-May and approximately mid-September.

26. The Political Committee also agreed that, once
disengagement had been completed, which is scheduled
to occur 10 weeks after the coming into force of the
plan (D+70), the headquarters of the Joint Military
Commission should be co-located with MONUC
headquarters at Kinshasa, subject to the provision of
security guarantees for all its members, and that joint
support and administrative structures should be
established there.

27. The Political Committee noted that some parties
were still in the process of finalizing their plans to
release prisoners of war and hostages in cooperation
with the International Committee of the Red Cross, and
called on those parties to complete their plans
promptly. The Political Committee, noting that the
neutral facilitator for the inter-Congolese dialogue had
opened an office in Kinshasa, also noted that progress
in this regard would significantly reinforce efforts
towards the successful implementation of the Lusaka
Agreement.

28. The implementation of the disengagement plan
will lend impetus to the deployment of the second
phase of MONUC. In order to deploy, MONUC
urgently needs a number of specialized military units
and additional aircraft. These include flight operations
teams, airfield crash rescue and firefighting, cargo
handling, fuel servicing and water processing units, as
well as the necessary equipment. Without the advance
provision of these services, the deployment and
sustainment by air of military units in the interior of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo will become
exceedingly difficult and dangerous to the point where,
in effect, deployment cannot proceed. Accordingly, the
Secretariat has addressed urgent pleas to potential
troop-contributing countries in order to obtain these
and other support units, as well as the remaining
infantry battalions required.

IV. Military developments

29. On the basis of reports from MONUC, the
Secretariat has informed the Security Council of a
number of breaches of the ceasefire and the persistence
of military preparations on several fronts in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Permanent
Representatives of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Rwanda and Uganda wrote separately to the
President of the Security Council during the month of
March concerning allegations of violations of the
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

30. During February, fighting continued around
Mbandaka, where Government troops and the MLC
forces were reportedly engaged in clashes; around
Ikela, where Zimbabwean, Namibian and Congolese
troops relieved the encirclement of an allied force; and
in the east, where clashes between armed groups and
Rwandan and rebel forces were reported.

31. The Secretariat also received reports at that time,
supported by video footage, concerning the fighting
between the Lendu and Hema communities of
Orientale Province. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo claimed that more than 7,000 had died in these clashes, which they describe as genocide.

32. Unrest was also reported from Goma and Bukavu, where the local population conducted strikes against the RCD authorities from 31 January to 6 February. The difficult economic situation and the Rwandan occupation were also cited as reasons.

33. The chain of acts of civil disobedience culminated in RCD-Goma’s refusal to allow Archbishop Kataliko to return to his parish in Bukavu. The disturbances were accompanied by the re-emergence of Radio patriotique, which is known to have broadcast anti-Tutsi messages in August 1998 inciting massacres of Tutsis in Bukavu and Uvira. According to a credible source, during the broadcast, Radio patriotique called upon the people of Bukavu to “sharpen their machetes, lances and spears in order to be ready for the next phase”.

34. According to a report received from a non-governmental organization, an estimated 150,000 Banyamulenge are surrounded, and are at risk of violent attack in South Kivu. There is a fear that ethnically based communal violence has the potential to engulf the whole subregion. A Banyamulenge organization called Forces républicaines et fédéralistes has sent a message to the Secretary-General complaining of large-scale violations of human rights in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and warning that the stage was being set for a genocide directed at the Banyamulenge.

35. In March, RCD-Goma and the Rwandan army reportedly launched an offensive southwards and westwards in Kasai Province. Forces of RCD-Goma and the Rwandan Patriotic Army seized the town of Idumbe on 12 March, and advanced further westwards the following day towards Longa and Lodi. According to the same reports, they also attacked the town of Bena Leka, which lies astride the strategically important rail/road link between Ileo and Kananga. The port of Ileo is a vital link in the Government supply line to its forces in Kasai and Katanga. RCD-Goma and the Rwandan Patriotic Army were also reportedly continuing their efforts to cut off Kabinda from Mbuji Mayi.

36. At the same time, RCD-Goma complained to MONUC of a number of attacks launched by pro-

Government Mayi-Mayi fighters, sometimes assisted by Burundian rebels, against Fizi and in the vicinity of Uvira in South Kivu.

37. MONUC has received reports to the effect that the Congolese Armed Forces are planning an attack against MLC along the Ubangi River and against Basankusu; MLC were reported to be training several hundred recruits.

38. In view of the upsurge in military activity by MLC, which began in early April, MONUC also understands that military commanders allied to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo fear further attacks by the rebels on the key town of Ilebo and on Mbandaka.

39. The Force Commander of MONUC, Major General Mountaga Diallo, assumed his duties on 4 April and took part in the meetings of the Joint Military Commission and the Political Committee at Kampala.

V. Cooperation with the Joint Military Commission

40. By paragraph 6 of its resolution 1291 (2000), the Security Council decided that MONUC would establish, under the overall authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, a joint structure with the Joint Military Commission that would ensure close coordination during the period of deployment of MONUC, with co-located headquarters and joint support and administrative structures.

41. In view of the policy of the Joint Military Commission to relocate its headquarters to Kinshasa, MONUC has continued to proceed on the assumption that the co-location will be established there. In-depth discussions in New York and Lusaka with General Lallali, the Chairman of the Commission, have helped to clarify the precise relationship between the two organizations and their respective functions. Following additional discussion of this matter at the Political Committee meeting at Kampala in April (see para. 26 above), a more detailed picture has emerged of how the two organizations would work together in Kinshasa.

42. As a full participant in the central Joint Military Commission in Kinshasa, MONUC would expect to be able to propose the convening of Commission meetings and to initiate their agenda. Decisions would be taken
by consensus. MONUC would then expect the parties to abide by the decisions taken by the Commission and to implement those decisions in the field under United Nations verification. Though the Joint Military Commission would continue to report to the Political Committee established by the Lusaka Agreement, military information and analysis about the situation on the ground would be provided to it by MONUC on the basis of reports from its sectors and military observers, and those of the regional Joint Military Commissions and OAU verifiers.

43. During his visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the other States parties to the Lusaka Agreement in March 2000, the Under-Secretary-General raised with all his interlocutors the need to strengthen the Joint Military Commission and to relocate it as soon as possible to Kinshasa. In subsequent letters to the Heads of State concerned, he stressed the need to resolve any security-related misgivings that had been expressed by the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda.

44. Pending the relocation of the Joint Military Commission to Kinshasa, MONUC has taken steps to improve communications between MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa and the temporary site of the Joint Military Commission in Lusaka. MONUC is also deploying additional planning officers to the Commission to assist in the analysis of information.

45. Nevertheless, the Joint Military Commission continues to experience significant operational and organizational difficulties. When MONUC urgently convened a meeting of the Commission in Lusaka on 20 March in connection with reports of offensive military action in Kasai, many representatives were absent, as was the Chairman. Nor was there any follow-up to the decisions that were eventually taken. It has also become clear that the parties have not provided the Commission with the military information necessary for the development of plans for disengagement and redeployment, as called for by the Lusaka Agreement and by resolution 1291 (2000). Commission representatives have also experienced financial difficulties. It is not envisaged that the United Nations will assume any responsibility for the financial support of delegates sent to the Commission by the parties. The financial support of Commission members should remain the responsibility of the parties.

VI. Inter-Congolese dialogue

46. By paragraph 7 (h) of its resolution 1291 (2000), the Security Council decided that MONUC should cooperate closely with the facilitator of the national dialogue, provide support and technical assistance to him, and coordinate the activities of other United Nations agencies to that effect.

47. The inter-Congolese dialogue has not advanced, despite the acceptance by Sir Ketumile Masire of the role of neutral facilitator. There is increasing awareness that a peaceful solution of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo may not be possible in the absence of progress in the national dialogue called for in the Lusaka Agreement and which enjoys the support of the international community.

48. The participation of the facilitator in the Security Council debate on the Democratic Republic of the Congo in January provided a good opportunity to discuss his needs as well as the support that could be provided to him. It was clear to all that, in addition to the full cooperation of the parties, the facilitator will need considerable human, material and logistic support in order to succeed in his task.

49. To that end, a donors’ meeting co-chaired by the United Nations and OAU was held on 27 January, at which the facilitator presented preliminary requirements for achieving the objectives of his mission. The United Nations and OAU called on Member States to provide the assistance needed and pointed out that financial contributions could be made to the United Nations Trust Fund to support the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as to the OAU Peace Fund. Some Member States have indicated their intention to provide the assistance needed, and others have confirmed previously announced pledges.

50. In consultation with OAU, the Secretariat has been working with the facilitator to assess his requirements and encourage donors to contribute to the cost of his operations. Since the donors’ meeting, the Secretariat has met twice with the Permanent Mission of Botswana to discuss and finalize the budget for the facilitator. Some Member States have also been assisting the facilitator in this regard. During the recent visits of the facilitator to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC provided him with assistance and support.
51. During the debate in the Security Council, President Kabila declared his readiness to begin the national dialogue and to guarantee the security of all participants. He also met with the facilitator in New York on 27 January. Since then, the facilitator has held a number of discussions with some of the other parties concerned on the organization of the national dialogue. From 11 to 17 February, he visited Kinshasa, where, in addition to another meeting with President Kabila, he met with representatives of the opposition and of civil society, as well as with my Special Representative. The facilitator then visited Kigali and Kampala, where he met with representatives of the rebel groups.

52. Despite those positive steps, the facilitator has continued to encounter a number of difficulties in the fulfilment of his task that are preventing him from pursuing his consultations and are delaying the organization of the dialogue.

53. Though a number of Member States have made pledges or contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund to help finance the facilitator’s activities, more resources will be required to supplement the support that MONUC will be able to provide.

54. Moreover, during his visit to Kinshasa from 20 to 22 March, the facilitator was not able to travel within the Democratic Republic of the Congo and had to cut short his visit to the country following the Government’s refusal to give clearance for him to travel outside Kinshasa in the aircraft MONUC had placed at his disposal. Mr. Masire issued a statement in which he deeply regretted that unfortunate situation and hoped that the Government would realize the necessity of assisting him to carry out his mandate. Since then, he has been invited by the Government to return to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and has agreed to do so. It is obvious, however, that the facilitator will not be able to play an effective role unless his freedom of movement and capacity to perform his task are reliably guaranteed.

VII. Human rights

55. The human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo — whether in Government or rebel-held territory — remains grave. The ongoing conflict has only served to exacerbate the already dire situation. Reports continue to be received of massacres, executions, arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions, torture, inhuman and degrading treatment of suspects and detainees, as well as the imposition of restrictions on freedom of expression, association and movement. This situation cannot improve without strict respect for the ceasefire and compliance with the terms of the Lusaka Agreement.

56. In spite of the 10 December statement by the Minister for Human Rights suspending the use of capital punishment, the Military Court of Justice has sentenced and executed 19 persons, some only hours after they were sentenced. The statutes of the Military Court of Justice make no provision for appeals. Another 85 persons have been sentenced and await execution.

57. At the same time, as was noted in my last report, the Government has continued to free political prisoners, in accordance with the Presidential Decree of 19 February 2000 on the amnesty law. To date, more than 250 prisoners have been released in Kinshasa and in Katanga Province. However, it should be noted that most of those recently released were military officers and not civilian political detainees. On 8 March, a 13-member Ad Hoc Commission (Commission ad hoc chargée de veiller à la stricte application du décret) headed by the Minister of Justice was established and charged with ensuring the strict application of the Presidential Decree on amnesty; the Commission is mandated to review the cases of those persons who stand to benefit from the amnesty. The positive effects of the amnesty law are counteracted by the continuing restrictions on political parties and activities under Decree Law No. 194.

58. In rebel-held territories, human rights and civil society activists are constantly harassed and threatened by rebel leaders. Since Archbishop Kataliko was prevented from returning to his diocese in February, tensions between the civilian population and RCD continue to rise. Days of protest against the foreign forces have been organized by the local populations in Bukavu, Goma, Kindu and Kisangani.

59. On 29 March, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Roberto Garretón, submitted his sixth report to the Commission on Human Rights. He expressed his deep concern about the continuing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict, particularly the massacres in the eastern part of the
country, and continuing violations of the freedom of opinion and expression of journalists and human rights defenders.

60. It is important to note that all parties to the conflict now openly recognize that gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have occurred and continue to occur throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and they are now calling for investigations into allegations of massacres.

61. In my last report, I noted the allegation that 15 Congolese women had been buried alive at Mwenga, South Kivu Province. From 28 January to 15 February 2000, at the request of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, a two-person team from the human rights field office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo conducted a preliminary investigation into the Mwenga massacre. Although the team visited Bukavu, Bunia and Goma, it did not gain access to Mwenga itself because of the precarious security situation. However, it was able to collect first-hand information and interview some eyewitnesses. On the basis of these preliminary findings, the human rights team ascertained that the incident did indeed take place. However, since many important details remain undetermined, a more in-depth investigation with anthropological and forensic capability is needed.

62. The first deployment of human rights officers in MONUC has been completed. In accordance with the memorandum of understanding between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, they received a briefing from the human rights field office. As part of the phase II deployment of MONUC, additional human rights officers will be deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in areas controlled by the Government and by the rebel forces. Their presence will increase the capacity of MONUC to monitor the human rights situation in the country.

VIII. Humanitarian aspects

63. Humanitarian needs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have attained massive proportions, with some 1.3 million internally displaced persons and 300,000 refugees, and a further estimated 14 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. Overall, the humanitarian situation in the eastern part of the country has deteriorated rapidly since the start of the year, with some 550,000 internally displaced people caught up in the war.

64. According to reports emerging from the Ituri area, in Fataki and Rethy north of Bunia, major humanitarian problems have been found by relief agencies. The Hema, Lendu and Nande ethnic groups are currently locked in a dispute over land allocation in this area, causing mass population displacement. Following a series of threatening incidents, relief agencies were forced to limit their activities or withdraw from the area completely.

65. The fighting in the Kivus has also resulted in major population displacements since the beginning of the year. An estimated 60,000 newly displaced have fled to Uvira and along the Ruzizi plains, and reports indicate that 15,000 to 20,000 persons (mainly Banyamulenge) are from the Moyen Plateau. The total number of displaced in South Kivu is estimated at 300,000, with a further 250,000 people displaced in North Kivu. Meanwhile, most of South Kivu is inaccessible for the relief community.

66. Last month, some 700 Banyamulenge arrived in Bujumbura, fleeing fighting and attacks by armed groups in South Kivu. UNHCR received this group and undertook an evaluation of their assistance and protection needs. According to reports there is another group from the same area, estimated to be around 1,200 Banyamulenge, in Uvira being prevented from crossing into Burundi. Insecurity has prevented UNHCR from carrying out assessments in this area.

67. Early in April, the Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator undertook a mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to evaluate coordination arrangements and the current response by the relief community to the needs of the vulnerable populations. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to complying with the principles of engagement for humanitarian assistance, recognizing the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian action and pledging full support to cross-line operations to assist all vulnerable populations regardless of location.

68. The recommendations resulting from the mission include the need to strengthen assistance coordination throughout the whole country and to expand humanitarian operational space through continued dialogue with all parties. In addition, it was
recommended that the United Nations should undertake a number of confidence-building measures through specific cross-line actions, such as national days of immunization, demobilization of child soldiers and family reunification. In Kinshasa, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs raised a number of issues with the Government, including the restrictive currency exchange controls. Relief operations remain prohibitively expensive and unsustainable despite the Government’s introduction of a more favourable dollar exchange rate for the Congolese franc.

69. To date there has been an extremely poor donor response to the 2000 United Nations Consolidated Appeal, by which $73.1 million was requested. Less than 4 per cent, or $1.2 million, has been received to date to support the needs of the most vulnerable. The 1999 Appeal, by which $38 million was requested, has had a 17 per cent response rate.

IX. Child protection

70. As indicated in my previous reports, the priorities for child protection continue to be the issue of access to war-affected children for the provision of humanitarian assistance; the demobilization and reintegration of child combatants; the protection and safe return of internally displaced and refugee children; and the training and sensitization of peacekeeping personnel (civilian and military) in addressing the needs of war-affected children. With the deployment and arrival of the first few child protection advisers in MONUC during the reporting period, closer attention has begun to be paid to these issues in close coordination with UNICEF and national authorities.

71. Since my last report, the child protection staff of MONUC has developed and implemented an orientation/training programme for incoming military liaison officers on issues relating to war-affected children and participated in meetings with United Nations agencies and local and international non-governmental organizations on addressing the needs of those children. Field missions have also been undertaken to Bunia, Bukavu, Goma, Kalemie, Kampala and Kisangani for talks with the two wings of RCD on the needs of children in areas under their control. Discussions followed up on commitments made to my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict in February 1999 with regard to refraining from the recruitment of those under the age of 18, planning for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers, and improving access to health, nutrition, education and shelter for displaced and orphaned children.

X. Financial aspects

72. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1291 (2000), I requested the General Assembly to grant me commitment authority, with assessment, in the amount of $200 million to ensure that MONUC is provided with the necessary resources to cover its immediate requirements and to enable it to initiate logistical preparations for the phase II deployment as mandated by the Council. By its resolution 54/260 of 7 April 2000, the General Assembly granted the requested commitment authority of $200 million, inclusive of $41 million previously authorized for MONUC by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and approved assessment of this amount on Member States.

73. With regard to the Trust Fund to support the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as at 13 April 2000 contributions and pledges amounted to $1.6 million.

74. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at 31 March 2000 amounted to $1,903.3 million.

XI. Observations

75. There have been recently a number of indications of progress in the Lusaka process. These include, in particular, the undertakings of cooperation made by the leaders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the other signatory States during the visit of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; the decision of the Political Committee on 8 April in Kampala to adopt the disengagement and redeployment plan submitted by MONUC and the Joint Military Commission; the communiqué issued by the allied Presidents the following day in Kinshasa calling for the speedy deployment of MONUC military observers; and the outcome of the special cabinet meeting of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 10 April.
76. At the same time, however, notwithstanding the clear assurances provided by the parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, fighting has been taking place on several fronts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, apparently in connection with well planned and organized military action aimed at strategic objectives. There are also indications, including the purchase of arms and the recruitment and training of troops by some of the parties, that they may be preparing for new military activities. These developments have raised questions about the commitment of the parties to the ceasefire.

77. I am particularly disturbed at the repeated warnings that have been received from knowledgeable observers that certain populations in the Kivus and in the Ituri district may be the victims of widespread ethnic violence. I call on all those with influence over the situation in those areas to do their utmost to reduce the level of tension and to seek peaceful solutions to the conflicts there.

78. One important indicator of the commitment of the parties is the degree of access that MONUC will enjoy to the sites provisionally selected for the deployment of the four battalions that will comprise the bulk of the phase II force. While delays do continue to arise in the granting of flight clearances, MONUC intends to proceed on the basis that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the other parties will cooperate with the Mission’s plans to undertake comprehensive surveys of these locations with a view to deploying there if the conditions are found to be acceptable.

79. It is hoped that, with the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the parties, and given adequate security conditions, it should be possible to complete the deployment of military liaison officers to Bukavu, Kabalo, Kabinda, Kalemie, Mbandaka and Mbuji Mayi within a very short space of time. The Secretariat will also continue actively to carry out the logistical preparations for phase II with a view to preparing for the deployment of the first contingents as soon as possible. In this regard, the issuance by the military commands of the belligerents of the necessary ceasefire orders is an important step forward. In the meantime, MONUC will do everything it can to assist the parties to finalize their disengagement plans pursuant to the 8 April agreement and to monitor their implementation. To that end, MONUC will deploy as soon as possible, with the aid of additional air assets.

80. Given the assumption of cooperation, the timely provision by troop-contributing countries of the necessary military personnel, especially specialized military units, becomes all the more important and urgent. In this context, I commend those countries which have confirmed their readiness to provide some of the necessary indispensable services, and invite others to consider providing the specialized units that remain to be identified in order to ensure the deployment and sustainment of MONUC in conditions of adequate safety.

81. For the immediate future, it is also necessary to continue efforts to enhance the capability of the Joint Military Commission, to enable it to meet promptly when required and address all ceasefire violations, as well as the other matters before it, in a timely and effective manner. The decision of the Political Committee of 8 April to support the co-location of the Joint Military Commission with MONUC in Kinshasa is a significant step forward in this respect. I look forward to further indications that all the parties to the Lusaka Agreement will adhere to the undertakings they have made in signing the accord, as well as those they gave to the Under-Secretary-General, and which they essentially reiterated at Kampala on 8 April. I also wish to express my appreciation to the Governments of Argentina, India, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America for their contributions to the Joint Military Commission and/or the Trust Fund to support the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

82. The inter-Congolese dialogue is a critical component of the effort to facilitate a comprehensive negotiated settlement of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The facilitator needs the full cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the relevant Congolese parties in the task assigned to him. He also needs the strong support and assistance of the international community, and I urge all those in a position to help to contribute generously to the United Nations Trust Fund.

83. I am shocked at the death, injuries and destruction caused by the explosions at Kinshasa airport on 14 April. I note that MONUC immediately
offered its fleet of vehicles for the use of the authorities to transport the injured to hospitals. MONUC will continue to do everything it can to assist the authorities in its relief efforts. I extend my sincere condolences to the families of those who lost their lives in this terrible incident, and my hopes to the injured of a speedy recovery.

84. Finally, I wish to thank my Special Representative and all the military and civilian personnel of MONUC for the efforts they have made over the past few months, often in very challenging circumstances.
# Annex

**United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: contributions as at 11 April 2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Staff officers</th>
<th>Military liaison officers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan Arab Jamahiriya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** | **29** | **82** | **111**

* Including five clerks under staff officers.