



Security Council

Distr.: General
12 June 2000

Original: English

Third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

I. Introduction

1. By paragraph 19 of its resolution 1291 (2000), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to provide a report every 60 days on progress in the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and of that resolution. The present report, which has been prepared in accordance with that resolution, reflects developments since the Secretary-General's second report on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) (S/2000/330 and Corr.1 of 18 April 2000).

II. Political developments

2. On 30 April, the President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, as current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, convened a summit in Algiers, on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with the participation of President Chissano, President Konaré, President Kabila, President Mbeki, President Obasanjo, and a representative of President Chiluba, as well as the neutral facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire, and my Special Representative, Kamel Morjane. The objective of the meeting was to help move the peace process and the inter-Congolese dialogue to a new stage. Participants issued a statement in support of the Lusaka Agreement and the inter-Congolese dialogue. They encouraged the facilitator to pursue his mission and urgently appealed to the parties to fully cooperate with the ongoing efforts to organize and convene the dialogue. They also called for respect for the ceasefire and for the United Nations to move to the next phase of

its mission in the region. South Africa and Nigeria expressed readiness to consider contributing military personnel to MONUC.

3. From 4 to 8 May 2000, a Security Council mission led by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo and neighbouring countries pursuant to a letter dated 24 April 2000 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General (S/2000/344), which also contained the mission's terms of reference. The report of the Security Council mission is contained in document S/2000/416 of 11 May 2000.

4. During their visit, the members of the Security Council mission met in Kinshasa with President Kabila and with representatives of Congolese civil society, religious groups and political parties. Three of the members (the Permanent Representatives of Namibia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) visited Kananga, which had been identified as one of the four possible sites for the deployment of a MONUC battalion.

5. Immediately following their meeting with President Kabila, the members of the mission witnessed the signing of the status-of-forces agreement between MONUC and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The agreement was signed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Yerodia Abdoulaye Ndombasi, in the presence of President Kabila.



6. In their subsequent visits to Lusaka, Harare, Kigali and Kampala, the Security Council mission then met with President Chiluba, President Mugabe, President Kagame and President Museveni. In Lusaka, the mission met with the members of the Joint Military Commission, and then with the Political Committee. At that meeting, the Permanent Representative of France stated his intention, subject to the views of the Security Council as a whole, to invite the Political Committee to meet in New York during the French presidency, in the month of June. The meeting is scheduled for 15 and 16 June.

7. In their meetings with Presidents Kagame and Museveni on 7 and 8 May, the Security Council mission participated in intensive discussions with both Heads of State, which resulted in an agreement by Rwanda and Uganda to withdraw their forces from Kisangani following the clashes that had broken out between them early in May. However, the fighting later resumed and has since intensified (see paras. 11 to 13 below).

8. The Security Council mission also met with representatives of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and RCD-ML (also known as RCD-Kisangani), at Kigali and Kampala respectively. (The movement known as RCD-Goma has now resumed its former name of RCD.) Another faction of this movement, known as RCD-National, has reportedly been formed by a former senior official in RCD-Goma, Rogers Lumbala Tshitenge. On 7 June, it was announced that two former members of RCD-ML had left the party to form a new group called the Congrès des progressistes pour la libération (CPL). The leader of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), Jean-Pierre Bemba, despite having received an invitation from the mission to meet with its members in Kampala, did not appear, citing logistical difficulties.

9. On 3 June, President Kabila and President Kagame met at Eldoret in Kenya under the auspices of President Moi. The meeting was apparently the culmination of a series of discreet contacts involving a number of African capitals. While it is not clear that any substantive agreement emerged from the meeting, it appears to have ended in a cordial atmosphere. The two Heads of State reportedly discussed the Interahamwe and the release of prisoners of war.

10. The Political Committee met again on 8 June in Lusaka to discuss, *inter alia*, the preparations for its

meeting with the Security Council in New York on 15 and 16 June. Members also discussed the release of prisoners of war, the fighting in Kisangani and around Mbandaka, the inter-Congolese dialogue and the JMC's proposals for the implementation of the disengagement plan. These, however, were not approved.

11. During the period 9-12 June, as the present report was being completed, a series of violent demonstrations took place outside MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa. Several hundred demonstrators, apparently protesting against MONUC's supposed inaction during the fighting in Kisangani, threw stones at the headquarters building and the United Nations vehicles parked outside, smashing a number of windows. MONUC staff working in the building narrowly escaped injury from flying glass. Though local police stood by, the protests appeared to be coordinated by individuals in the crowd.

12. MONUC lodged a vigorous protest with the authorities, reminding them of their obligation to guarantee the safety and security of United Nations staff.

III. Military developments

Fighting in Kisangani

13. Persistent outbreaks of heavy fighting in the city of Kisangani, Orientale Province, have caused an estimated 150 civilian deaths and more than 1,000 casualties, as well as severe property damage. The belligerents concerned, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) have continued to fight in spite of repeated efforts that I and others have made to arrange a ceasefire.

14. On 8 June, together with the United States Permanent Representative, Ambassador Holbrooke, I contacted President Kagame and President Museveni to urge them to order an immediate cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of their respective forces in accordance with the agreement they signed with MONUC on 21 May. Though they agreed to do so, and the fighting subsequently eased in intensity, the two armies later resumed combat.

15. The fighting in Kisangani has been particularly destructive, with both sides using artillery, mortars and automatic weapons. In addition to the civilian deaths

and injuries and to the death of many soldiers in combat, this has resulted in serious damage to the power station, the hydro-electric dam, the cathedral and at least one hospital in the city. Large numbers of dwellings, including those occupied by the MONUC military observers, have been destroyed or seriously damaged. Electricity and water supplies have been cut off, and outbreaks of cholera are feared as residents use river water for their needs.

16. Serious fighting initially erupted in Kisangani in early May between the UPDF and the RPA, causing heavy loss of life among Congolese civilians. Despite the agreement reached by the Presidents of Rwanda and Uganda and a written agreement, brokered by MONUC, to withdraw their forces and demilitarize the city, heavy fighting subsequently broke out again on 5 June, even as the two forces were in the process of pulling back from the city.

17. On 12 June, reports indicated that Ugandan forces had withdrawn northwards from Kisangani and a cessation of hostilities appeared to have been put in place. United Nations and other humanitarian agencies have made arrangements for a flight of urgent food and medical supplies to be delivered to Kisangani as soon as security conditions permit. This will require action to secure the airport and provide unloading and delivery services to the agencies who will then distribute the supplies. In order for this effort to succeed, a reliable ceasefire will have to be maintained.

Kisangani demilitarization agreement

18. On 21 May, pursuant to the statement released by the Presidents of Rwanda and Uganda on 8 May during the visit of the Security Council mission, the military commanders of the two sides at Kisangani signed an agreement with MONUC to demilitarize the city. In accordance with the agreement, Ugandan and Rwandan units began withdrawing from their positions on 29 May with a view to pulling back to positions 100 km away from the city. It was in the midst of these preparations that fighting broke out on 5 June.

19. The plan called for the deployment of MONUC military personnel to Kisangani, including its two airports, port and military camps. MONUC military observers were to monitor and verify the simultaneous withdrawal of the Ugandan and Rwandan armed forces to designated locations.

20. Following the agreement, MONUC increased its presence in Kisangani from one to four 4-man teams of military observers, four staff officers and two civilian officials, and initiated preparations to dispatch a battalion to Kisangani. Though these preparations are now in abeyance as a result of the continuing fighting in the city, four additional observers have been dispatched to Kisangani and more are on standby.

Fighting in Equateur Province

21. Despite substantial compliance in other parts of the country with the ceasefire agreement of 14 April, starting early in May elements of MLC began a major southward advance along the Ubangi River, which forms the border with the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). This advance had continued despite assurances given on 23 May to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General by the MLC leader that his troops would halt their forward movement. During that meeting, Mr. Bemba had informed the Special Representative that his forces had been acting in response to attacks on them by the Government, and that they could not withdraw without exposing the local people to retaliation.

22. On 25 May, government forces and their allies announced that they had attacked MLC to stem their advance. This clash represented a major violation of the ceasefire agreement, as well as a serious threat to Mbandaka, since the MLC advance to the confluence of the Ubangi and Congo rivers to the south of the city cut the riverine route linking it with the capital.

23. While the Government counter-attack has apparently succeeded in driving some of the MLC forces back towards their original lines, some MLC forces are still understood to be in a position to interdict the resupply of Mbandaka by river. On 5 June, the Government and their allies requested the MONUC observer team in Mbandaka to convey a message to the MLC Chairman threatening to push back MLC troops by force if they did not withdraw to the positions held at the time of the signing of the Lusaka Agreement.

Fighting in the Kivus

24. MONUC is also concerned about reports of fighting in the Kivus, where clashes between armed groups and Rwandan troops, as well as armed attacks on civilians (see para. 25 below) have taken place. Inter-ethnic clashes are rampant throughout most of

North and South Kivu. RCD and their allies, who are nominally responsible for security there, seem unable to prevent killings by the former Rwandan Government forces (ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR)) and Rwandan and Burundese rebel groups, including the Interahamwe. The local armed group, known as the Mayi Mayi, is also involved in these attacks.

25. On 9 June 2000, a United Nations-led mission to the Haut Plateau area in the vicinity of Fizi-Uvira found that inhabitants there had effectively been under siege since March 2000. Only one route was now considered safe, and then only one day a week in each direction with military escort. The inhabitants have been subjected to repeated attacks by the Mayi Mayi and their Interahamwe and Burundese rebel allies, resulting in the forced displacement of some 35,000 people out of an estimated original population of 80,000. The Interahamwe have also reportedly conducted attacks at Masisi and other parts of North Kivu, resulting in civilian deaths and large-scale displacements. The Interahamwe may also have struck inside Rwanda itself.

Deployment of the Mission

26. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo now has a total of 228 military observers and military liaison officers deployed in and around the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex), including about 200 within the country, at Kinshasa and 11 other sites (Boende, Bunia, Gbadolite, Gemena, Goma, Isiro, Kananga, Kindu, Kisangani, Lisala and Mbandaka). The remaining 28 officers are stationed in the capitals of surrounding countries (see chart and map attached). MONUC is also examining the possibility of establishing a logistics base in the east of the country, perhaps at Goma, as well as a medical facility there. Much of the equipment required for the second phase of MONUC has already been procured.

27. As has been stressed in earlier reports, the deployment of United Nations troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo presents particularly acute problems of logistics. The degraded state of the infrastructure in the country, the effective blocking of its inland waterway system by the conflict and the lack of roads make it necessary initially to conduct all deployments and sustainment by air. This fact has placed particular importance on the provision of specialized units to prepare and ensure the security and

safety of airstrips in the interior, without which deployment cannot take place. The specialized units concerned include cargo loading and handling, meteorology, airspace management, movement control, water processing, fuel management, air crash rescue and firefighting teams.

28. In response to repeated requests, a few troop-contributing countries have offered to provide the infantry battalions and some of the specialized units required for the deployment of the second phase of MONUC. Currently the most glaring deficiencies are in cargo handling units and air crash and rescue capabilities.

29. Agreement in writing has been reached with troop-contributing countries in respect of three of the four battalions to be deployed in the second phase (Morocco, Pakistan and Senegal). The Secretariat has been in close contact with South Africa to follow up a request to that country to provide an infantry battalion and a number of specialized units.

30. On the basis of the offers received, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations drew up a plan envisaging that the first deployments of specialized units and a protection capability in Kisangani would begin in July. Deployments of the remainder of the battalion in Kisangani and the specialized units and infantry contingents in the other three locations would then follow from late July to October. This plan depended for its timely fulfilment on three conditions: the strict adherence of the parties to the ceasefire, their full cooperation with MONUC in ensuring security and freedom of movement and providing the necessary premises for United Nations facilities, and the readiness of the troop-contributing countries to ensure that the units they had contributed possessed adequate strength, equipment and training. Unfortunately, none of those three conditions has been met.

31. In accordance with normal procedures, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations subjects offers of troops and specialized units to an evaluation to ensure that the contingents concerned possess the necessary equipment and training to discharge their duties. This process has become particularly important in view of recent experiences in Sierra Leone.

32. Department inspections have found serious logistical deficiencies in the units scheduled to be dispatched to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. One country which had undertaken to provide four

airfield crash rescue units subsequently withdrew the offer and proposed only one unit instead. Another, which was supposed to provide an infantry battalion, has none of the 20 armoured personnel carriers required, and lacks significant amounts of other *matériel*, including generators, engineering equipment and radio-equipped jeeps. Some of the required equipment might be supplied by another donor country, but the timing and other details remain unclear. A third potential troop-contributing country, which had committed itself to providing a battalion, has informed the Department that it has no engineering equipment.

33. The first deployment of United Nations formed units was to have been at Kisangani. However, in view of the fighting that has erupted there in recent days, it is not considered possible or prudent at this stage to proceed with the necessary preparations. The fighting around Mbandaka and clashes in Kivu also have to be taken into account in this regard.

34. The restrictions imposed on the Mission's freedom of movement have become a major issue with MLC, RCD and the Government. MLC has blocked the efforts of MONUC to deploy a team to Basankusu in Equateur Province, while RCD has refused permission to MONUC to land at Kongolo airport and to deploy a military observer team in the town. That decision also effectively blocks the stationing of a MONUC team at Kabalo, as had been planned. In Government-controlled territory, MONUC was refused permission to land at Mbandaka even for the purpose of medical evacuation. The Government also refused to allow the deployment of a military observer team to Mbuji Mayi.

35. In spite of its signing of the status-of-forces agreement with MONUC during the visit of the Security Council mission, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has also refused the Mission's request to replace the current system of flight authorizations on a case-by-case basis with a system of advance notifications en bloc, a system which will be essential for the management of the large fleet of aircraft envisaged in the second phase. Furthermore, the local civilian and military authorities in the locations proposed for the deployment of MONUC battalions have not yet complied with the Mission's requests for assistance in identifying suitable premises, including the use of areas of Kinshasa airport that would be necessary for deployment.

36. In mid-May, MONUC took steps to secure the release of a team from the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) detained by troops of the Forces armées congolaises in Mbandaka. Although MONUC was assured of the UNHCR team's release, the team was in fact transferred to custody in Kinshasa. The team was not released until 26 May, after my Special Representative had raised the matter with President Kabila.

37. In accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1291 (2000), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has circulated to all peacekeeping missions, including MONUC, information concerning United Nations policies on HIV/AIDS. MONUC has also been asked to advise on measures that could be taken to help stem the spread of the disease. Incoming United Nations military personnel routinely receive instruction in precautions against the spread of HIV/AIDS. At a meeting with the Minister of Health of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 3 June, my Special Representative proposed that MONUC medical staff, together with World Health Organization personnel, work with the Ministry to develop sensitization programmes and procedures to distribute condoms.

IV. Humanitarian aspects

38. The number of persons in critical need of food in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is estimated at 16 million, or roughly 33 per cent of the country's population. The prolonged conflict and massive uprooting of rural populations has produced similar malnutrition rates among internally displaced, host communities and urban populations alike. There are more than 1.3 million people displaced, partly because of the highly volatile situation in the Kivus. About 5 million persons throughout the country are completely or partially isolated from their traditional supply routes by insecurity or, in the case of Kisangani, by the after-effects of the fighting that broke out there early in May. The same factors have restricted the access of humanitarian workers to populations in need. In May, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Médecins sans frontières were forced for over three weeks to interrupt their support to nutritional centres in Kisangani.

39. In Ituri, despite the progress made in promoting respect for humanitarian principles among the local

authorities, the dispute over land allocation has led armed mercenaries — occasionally helped by foreign forces — to prevent displaced persons from returning to their land. Armed clashes also broke out despite the request for a humanitarian truce to allow students to take their national examinations. Furthermore, part of the population on the right bank of the Tshopo River had to flee their homes when heavy fighting broke out in their vicinity.

40. The towns of Uvira and Fizi in South Kivu have remained inaccessible to UNHCR because of increasing insecurity. There are reports of a refugee influx from the Democratic Republic of the Congo into Burundi.

41. In Equateur Province, the clashes between Government and MLC forces in the northern parts of the province have put Mbandaka under constant threat and restricted the use of the Ubangui and Congo rivers to deliver relief supplies. The fighting has also hampered efforts to deal with a cholera outbreak brought to Mbandaka by barge passengers from Kinshasa. Over 100 cases have been registered since 16 March. Humanitarian personnel from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Food Programme, MONUC and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations are in the process of establishing a humanitarian office in Mbandaka to help improve access and staff security.

42. At a meeting with my Special Representative on 3 June, the Minister of Health of the Democratic Republic of the Congo drew his attention to the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS in the country, particularly in those parts where foreign troops were stationed. In some towns, infection rates were reportedly estimated to be as high as 90 per cent, with even many schoolchildren infected. The frequent incidence of rape and the absence of condoms contributed to the spread of the disease.

43. MONUC and the humanitarian agencies are continuing to experience difficulties arising from the official Government exchange rate, which effectively magnifies the cost of conducting activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An approach is being made to the Government to secure a more favourable and realistic exchange rate, as was called for in the status-of-forces agreement signed on 4 May.

V. Human rights

44. The human rights situation throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to give serious cause for concern. Although the Government has announced a moratorium on the carrying out of death sentences, the arrest of Government opponents, trade unionists and journalists continues, and many political prisoners remain in jail. In this connection, the Minister of Information has declared his intention to introduce a law abolishing imprisonment for press offences.

45. Meanwhile, the pace of military executions continues unabated in both Government-controlled territories and rebel-held areas, and there is also no indication when the projected Appeals Chamber of the Military Court will become effective. The continuing executions of Government soldiers appear to confirm reports of a growing number of desertions from the Forces armées congolaises. MONUC has initiated discussions on reform proposals with the judges of the Military Court.

46. Although it is difficult to confirm recent reports by Amnesty International that the human rights situation has recently deteriorated, there is disturbing evidence of the excesses of various State security institutions, which have sweeping powers of arrest and detention, with detainees having little recourse to the law. The prohibition of political activities is still in force despite the provisions in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement concerning the inter-Congolese dialogue.

47. This further undermines the hopes that were placed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo upon the appointment of a Minister of Human Rights, who it was believed, was going to contribute to the improvement of the human rights situation in the country. It is difficult to reconcile the prevailing situation with the requirements of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which envisages the participation in the national dialogue of various opinion groups, civil organizations and the political opposition.

48. The human rights situation is further aggravated by a justice system controlled at every level by the State, and unable to grant defendants the most elementary procedural guarantees.

49. In the rebel-held areas, recent outbreaks of heavy fighting, especially in Equateur Province, reportedly involve severe human rights violations. According to

several reports from local human rights non-governmental organizations in the eastern region of the country, rebels, the Ugandan and Rwandan armies and non-signatory armed groups engage in regular acts of violence, the systematic use of torture, rape and robbery, the restriction of movement and enforced deportation.

50. The Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has written to the President of the Security Council (S/2000/453 and 468) to draw his attention to the massacre of civilians in Katogota (South Kivu). This incident has now been confirmed by a team of United Nations investigators, comprising a Human Rights Officer and a Humanitarian Affairs Officer. While there is compelling evidence that the massacre did occur, the investigators could not determine the exact number of victims.

VI. Child protection

51. Recent reports from MONUC military observers appear to indicate that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Congolese rebel movements and the armed groups continue to recruit and train children in their armed forces. Though no figures are available, MONUC is aware of accounts that at least one front-line unit may contain a large proportion of boys and girls aged from 12 to 16. These children, though armed, are unpaid and have been accused of taking what they need from the local civilian population by force. Gathering further information about such units will be a major priority of the MONUC child protection staff.

52. The Ministry of Defence has informed UNICEF that President Kabila has yet to sign the decree on the *Coordination nationale de démobilisation et de réinsertion*, which would declare the Government's willingness to demobilize child combatants and refrain from recruiting children into its armed forces. MONUC has strongly urged the Government to sign this instrument, and will seek to engage the other parties to sign similar decrees in turn.

53. The Child Protection Section of MONUC, together with UNICEF, the World Health Organization, UNHCR, the World Food Programme and other agencies and non-governmental organizations, has been developing plans for the implementation of a series of national immunization days. These are to be held from

7 to 9 July; from 11 to 13 August; and from 13 to 15 September throughout the entire territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is intended to immunize some 11 million children aged 5 years or under. MONUC is prepared to provide assistance in accordance with its capacities.

54. During the reporting period, the child protection advisers contributed to the conduct of orientation and training seminars for incoming military liaison officers on issues relating to war-affected children.

VII. Inter-Congolese dialogue

55. On 25 April, the neutral facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire, briefed the Security Council on the approach he intended to follow in carrying out his mandate. He presented a broad outline of his work plan, consisting of three phases. During the preliminary consultative phase, which ended in April, the facilitator had contacted all Congolese parties and groups expected to participate in the dialogue. During the second phase (May-June), the Congolese parties would seek to reach agreement on crucial issues such as the venue, draft agenda, level and type of participation, rules of procedure and structure of the dialogue. The inter-Congolese dialogue itself would constitute the third phase. It is scheduled to commence no later than 3 July and to last 45 days.

56. Following his visit to New York, the facilitator travelled to Kinshasa on 11 May, where he met with President Kabila and with representatives of the unarmed opposition and civil society. He also met with the leaders of RCD at Goma, RCD-ML at Bunia and MLC at Gbadolite before returning to Kinshasa on 21 May. In part the facilitator's discussion with the Congolese parties and groups concerned the planning of the preparatory meeting to be held at Cotonou to finalize arrangements for the inter-Congolese dialogue. Before his departure, the facilitator invited the Congolese parties and groups concerned to attend the Cotonou meeting on 5 and 6 June.

57. The facilitator left Kinshasa on 24 May without seeing President Kabila, but met instead on 23 May with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

58. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which had been critical of the facilitator's work plan, did not attend the Cotonou meeting. Furthermore, on 5 June government officials prevented

representatives of civil society and the unarmed opposition from departing from Kinshasa to attend the meeting.

59. On 6 June, representatives of MLC, RCD, the unarmed opposition and the *forces vives* from rebel-controlled territory issued a statement at Cotonou deploring the absence of the Government and the Government's refusal to allow other participants from Kinshasa to take part. The statement called for the convening of a second preparatory meeting on 3 July at Gaborone under the chairmanship of Sir Ketumile Masire.

60. MONUC has taken steps to place the expertise of its staff at the disposal of the facilitator, including the provision of both financial and political advice. In consultation with the facilitator, the Secretariat has made arrangements for a senior adviser, Albert Tévoédjé, to travel with him during some of his consultations and to assist him on an ad hoc basis in the organization of the preparatory meeting in Cotonou. MONUC has also agreed to provide air transportation for the facilitator, and to help arrange such transportation from other sources, subject to eventual reimbursement from the trust fund. MONUC also offered the use of an aircraft to transport members of political parties and civil society from Kinshasa to Cotonou after the Government prevented them from travelling.

61. However, notwithstanding this support, pending resolution of the problem of the assured longer-term financing of the facilitator's activities, funding shortages persist. Notwithstanding the recent provision of some \$0.3 million from the Trust Fund for the Support of the Peace Process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to cover air transportation costs, the facilitator's current operations are being funded by the Government of Botswana on a temporary basis, on the understanding that they will eventually be reimbursed from donor contributions. At a meeting he held with donor countries in Kinshasa during his recent visit, the facilitator raised doubts as to how long he could continue to operate without the necessary funding. It is understood that, at his request, some donor Governments have agreed to consider depositing funds directly into a fund established for the facilitator's use in Gaborone.

62. On 9 June, the Information Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Didier Mumengi,

issued a statement describing the fighting in Kisangani as genocide against the Congolese people. The statement criticized the neutral facilitator for remaining silent in the face of this fighting and announced that the Government was withdrawing its confidence in Sir Ketumile Masire. The statement called on the Organization of African Unity to propose a new neutral facilitator.

VIII. Financial aspects

63. As indicated in my second report to the Security Council on MONUC (S/2000/330, para. 72), the General Assembly, by its resolution 54/260 of 7 April 2000, granted me commitment authority, with assessment, in the amount of \$200 million to cover the Mission's immediate requirements and to enable it to initiate logistical preparations for the phase II deployment as mandated by the Council. I have subsequently informed the General Assembly that some \$58.7 million of this amount is expected to be committed for MONUC during the period ending 30 June 2000 and have requested its authorization to use the remaining \$141.3 million during the period beginning 1 July 2000, pending submission to the Assembly at its fifty-fifth session of my comprehensive budget proposal for the Mission. The Assembly action on my request is expected shortly.

64. As at 31 May 2000, unpaid assessed contributions to the MONUC special account amounted to \$169.9 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to \$2,010.3 million.

IX. Observations and conclusions

65. The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the prospects for further progress in the peace process, have become particularly uncertain. Fighting around Mbandaka in Equateur Province, fresh clashes in Kisangani and fighting in the Kivus have cast into doubt the implementation of the ceasefire agreement signed at Kampala on 8 April despite widespread adherence to that agreement elsewhere in the country.

66. The Government's decision not to participate in the preparatory meeting for the inter-Congolese dialogue, its attempts to block the participation of the

unarmed opposition in Kinshasa and the chronic shortages and delays in the provision of resources for the facilitator's operations raise serious doubts concerning the future course of the dialogue. This is especially unfortunate in view of the close relationship that exists between the success of the inter-Congolese dialogue and progress in the peace process generally, including the implementation of the military aspects of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. These difficulties have been compounded by the Government's announcement, on 9 June, of its withdrawal of confidence in Mr. Masire and its request to the Organization of African Unity to nominate a new neutral facilitator.

67. Notwithstanding these developments, I express my appreciation to those donor Governments that have already disbursed their pledges to the facilitator and to those that are actively considering making disbursements, whether bilaterally, to the United Nations trust fund, or directly to the special account established in Gaborone for this purpose. I take this opportunity to restate my full support for the activities of the facilitator and my earnest hopes for the success of the inter-Congolese dialogue.

68. The people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo desire peace. The Government, the rebel groups and the Governments of the belligerent countries must demonstrate that they also desire it. Their repeated undertakings to cooperate with MONUC are not always supported by action. The denial of full freedom of movement to MONUC and the deeply regrettable outbreaks of violence in demonstrations outside MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa cast further doubt on the Government's attitude towards the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping troops. I reiterate in this connection the responsibility of the Government to ensure the security of United Nations personnel in the territory it controls.

69. Furthermore, the continued outbreaks of fighting in violation of the ceasefire and the difficulties experienced in the inter-Congolese dialogue augur ill for the timely deployment of the second phase of MONUC. Nevertheless, the Secretariat will continue its preparations for deployment in the hope that conditions will soon permit it. I will keep the Security Council informed accordingly.

70. Deployment is also subject to delays arising from the difficulties faced by the troop-contributing

countries that had undertaken to provide battalions and other units. Many of the contingents concerned lack essential equipment, without which it would be irresponsible to deploy them. For all these reasons, and in view of the recent experiences in Sierra Leone, I have ordered a full review and reassessment of the troop levels and other requirements before deployment takes place.

71. Much as the signing of the status-of-forces agreement between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUC during the visit of the Security Council mission in May is to be welcomed, it has failed to result in full freedom of movement for MONUC operations. The denial of flight clearances for medical evacuations, as occurred on 30 May, is particularly objectionable. Regrettably, MONUC has also faced the denial of its freedom of movement from MLC and RCD in recent weeks.

72. The fighting around Mbandaka, which represents a clear breach both of the Lusaka Agreement and the Kampala disengagement plan of 8 April, is also a serious setback to the peace process. I call on MLC and the Government to work with my Special Representative in restoring the ceasefire in Equateur Province without delay. As long as the fighting and uncertainty there persist, the deployment of MONUC phase II elements cannot proceed.

73. The renewed outbreaks of fighting in Kisangani between the Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces are a cause of profound disquiet. The civilian population of Kisangani has already suffered grievously in the crossfire between the two foreign forces that are fighting each other on Congolese territory. I deeply deplore the renewed outbreaks of fighting there and the consequent loss of civilian life and damage to property.

74. The city of Kisangani and its people are in urgent need of large-scale humanitarian assistance. As soon as the fighting has stopped and basic security conditions have been restored, the international community should consider launching a major effort to provide food, shelter and health care, as well as large-scale reconstruction and rehabilitation operations to help repair the damage wrought during the past few days and weeks. It may also be necessary to consider some form of assistance with the civil administration.

75. These emergency humanitarian operations should be regarded as quite separate from MONUC. The Council may wish to consider, perhaps on the basis of a

subsequent report, how the United Nations system and donor countries, in cooperation with MONUC, can assist in this effort.

76. The people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo deserve relief from the persistent violations of their human rights to which too many of them have been subjected. In many cases, these can be attributed directly or indirectly to the conflict in that country. I am shocked and saddened by the reports received of executions, torture, rape, robbery, the destruction of property and illegal detentions carried out in various parts of the country. The widespread hunger and displacement afflicting entire populations throughout the country are also a cause of dismay.

77. Only once all the signatories of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement have demonstrated genuine commitment to its terms and determination to fulfil the obligations they assumed therein can the United Nations hope to succeed in assisting them to do so. The way will then be open for the deployment of the second phase of MONUC, provided that the necessary facilities are made available, and the military units concerned are fully equipped and prepared to assume their tasks.

78. The meeting of the Political Committee in New York on 15 and 16 June, at the invitation of the President of the Security Council, is a welcome chance for all the parties to undertake a serious re-evaluation of the deteriorating situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is also an opportunity for the members of the Security Council to make it clear to the parties that their assurances of support for the peace process and guarantees of security and freedom of movement can no longer be taken at face value, but must be reflected in their actions.

79. I invite the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to demand that the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda order their respective armed forces to desist forthwith from further fighting and withdraw from Kisangani immediately and from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo promptly thereafter. Those two forces should be held accountable for the loss of life and the property damage they have inflicted on the civilian population of Kisangani.

80. I urge the Council, also acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, to demand the subsequent early withdrawal of all other foreign forces in the


Democratic Republic of the Congo, as foreseen in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The war there has already led to far too much death, destruction, hunger, human rights violations and population displacement. It must end now.

81. I wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, to the Force Commander, and to the military and civilian personnel of MONUC and other United Nations personnel operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular those who have been deployed to Kisangani. Their contribution to the cause of peace in that country is being made under particularly trying and difficult circumstances.

Annex

**United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo:
contributions as at 5 June 2000**

	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Staff officers</i>	<i>Total</i>
Algeria	6	1	7
Bangladesh	8	7	15
Benin	6	2	8
Bolivia	2		2
Burkina Faso	2		2
Canada		1	1
Czech Republic	3	1	4
Denmark		1	1
Egypt	11		11
France	2	1	3
Ghana	8		8
India	8	3	11
Jordan	2		2
Kenya		2	2
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	3		3
Malaysia	3	7	10
Mali	2		2
Nepal	9		9
Niger	2		2
Pakistan	12	16	28
Peru	3		3
Poland	1	1	2
Romania	11	1	12
Russian Federation	5		5
Senegal	13	10	23
South Africa	1		1
Sweden	2		2
Tunisia	6		6
Ukraine	2		2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1	5	6
United Republic of Tanzania	6	1	7
Uruguay	12	7	19
Zambia	9		9
Total	161	67	228



MONUC Positioning as of June 2000

HQ	MONUC Headquarters
MLO	Military Liaison Office and number of Liaison Officers
---	International boundary
- - -	District boundary
⊙	National capital
⊙	District capital
○	Town, village
—	Main road
—	Secondary road
—	Railroad
✈	Airport

Other MLO locations not shown on map:

MLO 1	Windhoek, Namibia
MLO 17	Lusaka, Zambia
MLO 2	Harare, Zimbabwe
MLO 1	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

0 100 200 300 km
0 100 200 mi

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.