Ninth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

I. Introduction


II. Political developments

2. The overall situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to develop in a largely positive direction. The ceasefire has held and the disengagement of forces and their redeployment to new defensive positions is effectively complete. Some foreign forces have been withdrawn from the territory. The preparatory meeting of the inter-Congolese dialogue, which is an essential element of the peace process, was held successfully. At the same time, outbreaks of fighting have continued, if not intensified, in the east of the country.

   My visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo

3. Prior to my visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I met President Kabila and President Kagame in Lusaka, on the margins of the thirty-seventh ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. The two Presidents pledged to take initiatives that would promote peace. They met again in Malawi on 26 September and also held separate meetings with other leaders in the region.

4. From 1 to 5 September 2001, I visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. During my visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I met in Kinshasa with the President, Joseph Kabila, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Léonard She Okitundu; the neutral facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire; and representatives of civil society, members of the diplomatic corps and the heads of United Nations agencies and MONUC staff.

5. During my meeting with President Kabila, on 2 September, I welcomed the Government's continuing adherence to the ceasefire on the confrontation line, but expressed grave disquiet over the continuing fighting in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Government should use all its influence to bring the fighting in the east to an end and open a dialogue with the Government of Rwanda. In addition, it should cooperate with MONUC in the preparations for the demobilization of the soldiers of Rwandan origin located at Kamina. In this regard, President Kabila announced that some 3,000 soldiers at that location would be demobilized shortly and invited MONUC to be present on that occasion.

6. I briefed the President on the Mission's plans for further deployment in the east of the country and requested the cooperation of his Government. During this visit, I conveyed the United Nations views on how to approach the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of the armed groups. I also indicated that
the positive response of the international community rested in part on continuing improvements in the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Finally, I expressed serious concern about the humanitarian situation and requested the Government to help improve access to populations in need.

7. On 3 September, I met with representatives of civil society and with the leadership of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) in Kisangani. At my meeting with the RCD leadership, I insisted on the earliest possible demilitarization of the town in accordance with Security Council resolution 1304 (2000). I also stressed that the further deployment of MONUC would require the full cooperation of RCD and would also entail, in due course, the rehabilitation of the rail link between Kisangani and Ubundu, so as to reopen the rail/river connection between Kindu and Kisangani (the K-2 link). The RCD leaders present indicated their agreement in principle with this approach.

8. On 4 September, I met with the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, in Kigali and conveyed to him my views on how to move the peace process forward. In particular, Rwanda should use its influence to halt the fighting in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. It should also commence a process of reducing its military presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in accordance with Security Council resolutions, and maintain a dialogue with that country, that would include confidence-building measures. I also conveyed to President Kagame my views on how to approach the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of the armed groups. President Kagame expressed his Government's willingness to take back the Rwandan former combatants now in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The President reiterated, however, that those suspected of crimes against humanity would be subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

Inter-Congolese dialogue

9. The preparatory meeting for the inter-Congolese dialogue was held at Gaborone from 20 to 24 August, in a spirit of conciliation and compromise. Some 70 delegates participated, representing the Government, the Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC), RCD-Goma, RCD-ML, the political opposition in Government-controlled areas and civil society. The meeting adopted a draft agenda for the national dialogue, its draft rules of procedure, and decided that the dialogue would start on 15 October in Addis Ababa.

10. The Gaborone meeting also resulted in a Declaration of Commitment in which the parties committed themselves to the liberalization of political activity; protection of fundamental human rights; release of political prisoners and prisoners of war; freedom of movement of people and goods throughout the country; re-establishment of communication links in the country and the rehabilitation of the infrastructure; restitution of seized property; protection of the population from arbitrary arrest; protection of natural resources from illegal exploitation; and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement. To monitor the implementation of the Declaration of Commitment, the parties also decided to put in place a follow-up committee, which held its first meeting at the end of October in Nairobi.

11. The preparatory meeting was an important exercise in confidence-building, during which the parties were able to develop unofficial channels of communication. In this connection, President Kabila held talks with the rebel leaders, Jean-Pierre Bemba, Chairman of MLC, and Adolphe Onusumba, President of RCD.

12. As requested by the facilitator, the United Nations will be providing conference-servicing assistance in the organization of the dialogue. In this connection, a senior United Nations conference coordinator has been assigned to the Office of the facilitator, in addition to staff made available through the Mission's budget.

13. The facilitator has confirmed that the inter-Congolese dialogue will begin on 15 October. After consultation with the Congolese parties, it was initially envisaged that the dialogue would gather more than 300 participants. However, because funds pledged by donors had not yet been made available, he decided, following consultations with the Congolese parties, to revert to the Gaborone formula by calling for a reduced meeting of some 70 participants. Such a meeting would address several outstanding political and procedural issues. The facilitator intends to convene the plenary meeting of the dialogue once sufficient funds are available.
14. The facilitator has expressed his deep concern to me that women may be inadequately represented in the inter-Congolese dialogue. He has appealed to the Congolese parties and signatories to the Lusaka Agreement to increase their quota of female representation.

Meeting of the Political Committee

15. A meeting of the Political Committee scheduled for 4 July was not held. A meeting was subsequently held on 14 and 15 September in Kigali under the chairmanship of the Rwandan Minister in the Office of the President, Patrick Mazimhaka. The Political Committee endorsed the decision of the Joint Military Commission to co-locate to Kinshasa with MONUC; that decision has yet to be implemented. It also decided that the next Chairman of the Political Committee would be Angola, with Uganda as Vice-Chairman.

16. However, the Political Committee did not address the status of the rebel faction (RCD-K) that has broken away from RCD, a number of alleged ceasefire violations in Katanga Province and the increasing level of military activity in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Political Committee also criticized what it called the "hesitancy" of the United Nations in deploying forces to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A proposal by MLC to establish a force comprising units from all three Congolese parties, under MONUC leadership, to ensure border security, was rejected by the Government.

17. During the session of the Political Committee, the Government of Rwanda invited representatives of all participating delegations to visit Nkumba camp, in Ruhengeri Province, where some 1,800 former anti-Government combatants are undergoing re-education and rehabilitation. The camp authorities presented a former ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR)/Interahamwe commander, who had been captured by government forces in July 2001. The commander gave an account of the support allegedly provided to armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. According to him, government aircraft dropped military material, communications equipment and large sums of Congolese currency. The officer also claimed that the attacks on Rwanda of May 2001 had been approved by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with the objective of destabilizing Rwanda and averting further attacks by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe.

Other developments

18. On 13 September, the Government announced its intention to pay retroactively three years' salary to magistrates and State workers in rebel-controlled territory. While MLC welcomed the Government offer and promised to cooperate, RCD claimed that the action was premature and should be discussed during the inter-Congolese dialogue. The rejection of the Government initiative by RCD led to unrest and demonstrations in Bukavu, leaving one person dead, and to the threat of labour strikes in Goma and Kisangani.

19. During August, the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie expelled 17 of its 51 founding members, some of whom subsequently aligned themselves with the Mouvement pour la libération du Congo. Meanwhile, leadership rivalries within the union of RCD-ML (Mouvement de libération) and MLC, known as the Front de libération du Congo (FLC), led RCD-ML to withdraw its support from FLC. RCD announced on 18 September that it had appointed a 70-member provincial assembly, whose seat is located in North Kivu, in keeping with its previously announced plans to establish a federal system of government in the areas of the country under its control. RCD also organized an "inter-Kivu dialogue" in Bukavu with participants from both North and South Kivu, from 25 to 29 September. The meeting was boycotted by many church and civil society groups.

III. Military and security developments

20. The ceasefire along the confrontation line has held since January 2001, and the armed forces of the parties have separated and redeployed, apart from a few minor exceptions, to new defensive positions.

21. Despite the calm along the front line, however, and the absence of ceasefire violations within the disengagement zone throughout the period under review, the situation in the east remains highly volatile. The number of alleged ceasefire violations has risen significantly; they are attributed mainly to armed groups. There are almost daily reports of fighting in the Kivus and on and along Lake Tanganyika and its western environs, much of the armed activity being
focused on the strategic town of Fizi. The fighting is largely between armed groups, including Burundian rebels, and RCD/RPA. In order to enhance its monitoring capabilities, MONUC has increased its presence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

22. At the Political Committee meeting held on 14 and 15 September, RCD accused the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of supporting armed groups and produced a list of generals of the Forces armées congolaises allegedly involved in the area. The Government vehemently denied this allegation. RCD also alleged that an aircraft landed at a location 180 kilometres west of Bukavu on a mission to resupply the Mayi-Mayi and ex-FAR/Interahamwe.

23. Early in September, a force apparently comprising armed groups captured the town of Fizi near Lake Tanganyika. Apparently, forces of the Front pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD) were preparing to launch an attack on Burundi from that area. RCD indicated to MONUC that, early in October, there were several clashes between RCD/RPA and FDD/Interahamwe in the area surrounding Fizi. Reportedly, RCD, RPA and Burundian forces have since retaken this strategic location. Significant movements of RPA troops on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were reported in connection with this objective.

24. Early on 29 September, armed elements, believed to be Mayi-Mayi militia, attacked Kindu. The attacks appeared to be aimed at the RPA command headquarters and the airport. The attacks were repulsed the same morning and the situation was brought under control by RCD troops occupying the town. The fighting resulted in a number of casualties among combatants and civilians. The MONUC sector commander tried to conduct an investigation of the incident, but the RPA authorities initially did not allow him to land in Kindu.

25. On 16 August, a MONUC helicopter was hit by 14 bullets, fired by unidentified armed men, as it flew between Uvira and Kaleme. It was able to land safely. Later, on 3 September, a MONUC patrol was held up and robbed at Mouchouchi (6 km along the Bukavu-Walungu road) by unidentified armed men. On 27 September, a locally recruited MONUC staff member in Goma was found dead in circumstances that suggested armed robbery.

Status of deployment of the Mission

26. As at 15 October, MONUC had a total of 2,408 military personnel including 540 staff officers and military observers as well as 1,868 infantry personnel (see annex). Within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in addition to Kinshasa, liaison officers continue to be deployed with the headquarters of rebel movements (Bunia, Gbadolite and Goma) and a further 23 remain stationed in the capitals of surrounding countries, including 16 officers as planning support to the Joint Military Commission. There is now a total of 77 military observer teams inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo, of which 46 are static and 31 are mobile. The static teams are placed at 41 new defensive positions, while mobile teams operate from sector headquarters and other locations, to provide a quick response to reported ceasefire violations. MONUC intends to enhance its overall monitoring capacity by increasing the number of monitoring teams to 91, of which 61 will be static and 30 mobile.

27. MONUC is also in the process of establishing four coordination centres, which will provide command and control for the military observers in areas distant from the sector headquarters and will improve the logistical support in the interior of the country, in addition to providing an enhanced medical evacuation capacity and increased forward mobility. The four coordination centres, located at Ilebo, Basankusu, Boende and Manono, should be completed by the end of the year.

Disengagement and redeployment of forces

28. MONUC has completed the verification of disengagement and redeployment of the parties, to the extent possible in the current circumstances. Effectively, 95 out of 96 new defensive positions have been verified and this element of the Lusaka process is therefore at an end. However, the new defensive positions of the Forces armées congolaises (FAC) at Emate-Loa, Abunakombo, Losombo and Djefera can still not be occupied as the MLC forces are maintaining administrative and police control over them. The matter of FAC troops occupying Bakambe (35 km north of Mbuji Mayi) and Tshilunde (20 km north of Mbuji Mayi) has also yet to be resolved.

29. Significant progress has been achieved in the south-eastern areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The only unverified new defensive position in
this sector is at Kamesha and RCD has stated that it
does not intend to occupy it. However, there have been
some violations of the disengagement plan at Moliro,
Pweto and Mani. A MONUC team was dispatched to a
new RCD defensive position at Moliro on 10
September, and reported a FAC force there, containing
army, navy and air force elements. At the Political
Committee meeting held on 14 and 15 September, the
Force Commander of MONUC, Major General
Mountaga Diallo, and the Chairman of the Joint
Military Commission were given the task of resolving
this issue and other matters, in coordination with the
parties.

Withdrawal of foreign forces

30. The Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) has
largely withdrawn from the Equateur Province,
leaving behind some elements in Lisala. However,
UPDF has declared that it will maintain one battalion
in Buta and two in the Ruwenzori Mountains in the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, until a
peace agreement is reached. They are also leaving a
small force of around two companies in Gbadolite. The
Namibian authorities indicated that they have already
withdrawn their troops except for a small element still
in Kinshasa and another stuck at Kamina because of
logistical difficulties. The Zimbabwean Defence Force
has declared the withdrawal of three battalions from
Equateur Province and the eastern part of the country,
but MONUC has yet to confirm this withdrawal. There
have been no withdrawals by RPA. On 2 October, the
Minister of Defence of Angola stated that his country
was ready to leave the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.

Cooperation with the Mission

31. The parties continue to provide satisfactory
security for MONUC military and civilian personnel
and, in almost every case where MONUC teams have
deployed, the local populations have welcomed them.

32. After mounting negative information campaigns
against MONUC in the past, RCD adopted a more
positive approach when it agreed to allow the Mission
to hold an information campaign at Kisangani on 17
August 2001. This provided an opportunity to meet
over 300 people and raise the Mission’s profile in the
local community. A similar event was held at
Basankusu on 27 August 2001 in MLC-controlled
territory.

33. In September, MONUC deployed to Uvira,
Bukavu and Beni to enhance its ability to monitor the
situation and investigate allegations of ceasefire
violations; 127 of a total of 147 ceasefire allegations
were filed by RCD, mainly against armed groups.
However, 87 of those allegations could not be
investigated by MONUC largely owing to the lack of
timely security guarantees by RCD or the difficulty in
identifying locations.

34. At the same time, RCD insisted on levying taxes
on MONUC contractors, contrary to the status-of-
forces agreement, the legal basis for MONUC
operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The refusal of RCD to accept this legal regime, and the
Mission’s insistence on the exoneration of its
contractors from taxes, has in effect led to a blockage
of fuel supplies for MONUC operations in Goma.
Following several high-level meetings with RCD, the
issue now appears to have been resolved. On 4
October, RCD also announced that it would allow
humanitarian barges to navigate freely in waters under
its control.

35. In recent weeks, MONUC has been approached
by numerous groups and individuals claiming to
represent the Mayi-Mayi, an ill-defined term generally
applied to local armed Congolese groups in opposition
to Rwandan forces. Some Mayi-Mayi groups appear to
be willing to work with RCD, while others appear to be
closer to the Government of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. With the information currently available,
it is difficult to assess the size and nature of the Mayi-
Mayi phenomenon. The Mayi-Mayi are seeking
representation in the inter-Congolese dialogue, and
appear to have been involved in recent outbreaks of
fighting in the east, particularly around Fizi and Kindu.
MONUC is seeking to broaden and deepen its contacts
with their representatives.

Combatants assembled at Kamina

36. During my visit to Kinshasa, President Kabila
invited MONUC to visit Kamina camp, in Katanga
Province, where some 3,000 men, said to be Rwandan
combatants, were reportedly located. On 12 September,
a MONUC team conducted a preliminary visit to the
camp, with a view to establishing the identity and
status of the combatants. Approximately 1,500 men,
who were uniformed but carried no arms, were
presented to the MONUC team.
37. At its request, the MONUC team was accompanied by representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Government delegation was led by the Minister for Security, Mwenze Kongolo, who included in his party members of a Rwandan group called the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR). Some members of the diplomatic corps participated in the visit. FDLR portrayed itself as the representative of the combatants at Kamina and stated a number of political demands aimed at the Government of Rwanda.

38. The senior officer of the soldiers assembled at Kamina declared that they had given up their arms and wished to return to their country. He repeated largely the same political demands that had been put forward by FDLR. MONUC indicated that it intends to conduct a thorough survey of the men to determine their exact identity and status. Steps have been taken to establish a military/civilian team at Kamina for that purpose.

**Situation in Kisangani**

39. RCD continues to reject the demilitarization of Kisangani and maintains forces there, allegedly to counter the threat by the Mayi-Mayi and FAC. However, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has stated that it has no intention of occupying Kisangani in the event of its demilitarization. In general, RCD continues to be suspicious of the motives for the demand to demilitarize Kisangani, despite the fact that it is aware that it could maintain administrative and police control of the town in the absence of military forces.

**Cooperation with the Joint Military Commission**

40. The Joint Military Commission, at its plenary meeting held on 5 and 6 September, approved the co-location of the Commission with MONUC. This was later endorsed by the Political Committee, the date of the move to be determined after the signing of a mission status agreement between the Joint Military Commission and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The move is to be completed by 31 October.

**IV. Humanitarian aspects**

41. The humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to be very grave, which underlines the urgency of efforts to restore peace to the country. A recent study by the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children’s Fund revealed that the vast majority of the population of 50 million people live on the equivalent of US$ 0.20 per person per day, and consume less than two thirds of the daily calories needed to maintain good health. Approximately 70 per cent of the population has little or no access to health care. The World Food Programme has estimated that 16 million Congolese have critical food needs. At the same time, humanitarian agencies have access to less than half of the estimated 2,041,000 displaced people in the country. Ongoing security constraints, particularly in Ituri and South Kivu, have left large numbers of people without external assistance. The kidnapping of a relief worker in the Ruzizi Plains area of South Kivu in September, although quickly resolved, highlights the difficult operating environment for humanitarian agencies.

42. On 22 May, in Mbandaka, the Security Council mission declared the River Congo open, so as to stimulate the resumption of trade, encourage greater contact between communities and improve humanitarian access. To follow this initiative, MONUC organized a donor-funded “peace boat”, which transported 600 tons of medical, school and other relief supplies from Kinshasa to Mongala in northern Equateur. The peace boat left Kinshasa on 31 July and returned on 31 August, carrying 900 tons of maize purchased by the European Union for distribution in Kinshasa.

43. The Democratic Republic of the Congo received two significant influxes of refugees in recent months. In the wake of the attempted coup in the Central African Republic in May 2001, approximately 25,000 people sought refuge in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the area around Zongo in northern Equateur. They were accompanied by approximately 1,200 ex-combatants. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and MONUC are taking steps to separate the two groups. Increased UNITA attacks in northern Angola sent two waves of refugees across the border at Kimvula. Nine thousand people crossed into the Democratic Republic of the...
Congo in mid-August, and another 3,000 in early October. UNHCR and its partners are working with local authorities to identify camp sites and re-locate the refugees. There are now approximately 193,000 Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who make up more than half of the 360,000 refugees in the country.

44. From 10 to 14 August, the Executive Director of UNICEF, Carol Bellamy, visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the second round of polio national immunization days. While approximately 10 million children were vaccinated against polio, the immunization days were also marked by several security incidents and the inability to access all parts of the country.

V. Human rights

Government-controlled territory

45. The Government has made some progress in establishing human rights laws and standards. Some non-judicial detention centres notorious for torture and extrajudicial killings have been closed, and there is a growing awareness on the part of the authorities of the need for democratic decision-making, good governance and respect for the rule of law.

46. Human rights abuses continue, however. Despite the adoption of a law liberalizing political activities, registered political parties were prevented from conducting political activities on the grounds that they lacked the necessary prerequisites for approval. Moreover, human rights activists and journalists are being held in detention for speaking out on political issues. Police harassment and the raiding of homes of political opponents have continued, and it is reported that many detainees are held without a duly executed warrant and rarely appear in court to be formally charged. There are also reports of the continuing use of torture in detention centres, many of which are not open to the public.

47. The Government has not yet honoured its commitment to suspend executions and abolish the death penalty. The Court of Military Order continues to impose the death penalty, and defendants have no right of appeal and at times no access to legal representation. Most recently, the Court at Likasi sentenced to death nine persons accused of plotting a failed coup against the late President. The Special Rapporteur for human rights, Roberto Garretón, and human rights organizations, have remarked upon irregularities during the trials.

48. It has also been reported that, since February 2001, some 80 persons are being detained in a prison in Makala in connection with the assassination of the late President Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The detainees are reportedly being denied medical care and regular meals, and are said to be in poor health.

Territory controlled by the Front de libération du Congo

49. The human rights situation in FLC-controlled territory continues to deteriorate. Clashes between armed groups have intensified, and the wave of refugees from the Central African Republic into Equateur Province, many with arms, has contributed to the concern about human rights.

50. There have also been extremely disturbing reports about the situation in Aru, Ituri Province, where some 750 civilians have reportedly been massacred within a six-week period. The deaths are reportedly motivated by suspicion of witchcraft, although other reports indicate that they may be politically and ethnically motivated.

Territory controlled by the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie

51. In the eastern provinces, reports have been received that RCD authorities continue to intimidate and harass human rights activists and to make arbitrary arrests. The media are still restricted, and the property of the media is confiscated. It has been reported that in Mboko-Swima and in Fizi (Uvira), RCD soldiers engaged in the rape of women and young girls. In Uvira, there have been reports of forced recruitment of young men into the army.

52. In North and South Kivu Provinces, the Mayi-Mayi, Interahamwe and the Banyamulenge security forces have reportedly conducted a reign of terror and brutal repression, as well as massacres against sympathizers or even persons suspected of sympathizing with opposing camps.

53. In general, refugee and internally displaced women are often preyed upon by armed elements and have been the victims of torture, sexual and other abuse and ethnically motivated killings. Rape has been used
as a weapon of war. The situation is particularly dire in the eastern provinces. The recruitment of able-bodied males into armed forces and factions have left households headed by women and girls to fend for themselves in a country whose economy and infrastructure has been decimated by years of war. The United Nations continues to draw the attention of the Government, the leadership of the armed groups and local authorities to the need to improve the human rights situation.

VI. Child protection

54. During the reporting period UNICEF and MONUC coordinated through a national implementing non-governmental organization partner, SOS Grands Lacs, the successful repatriation of demobilized child soldiers from Uganda to Ituri Province, where they were reunited with their families. Demobilization orders and the necessary travel documents were obtained from FLC and the Ugandan authorities. The children and their families received a repatriation package and were reintegrated into their communities where they are receiving schooling, vocational training and other assistance.

55. In Kisangani, commitments from local authorities were obtained to set up a local commission for the demobilization of child soldiers, and UNICEF and MONUC have begun interviewing child soldiers, having been granted access to the military camps for that purpose. MONUC and UNICEF have also organized workshops and training and counselling sessions on treatment of war-traumatized children for local administrative and military authorities and civil society.

56. In Kinshasa, MONUC, UNICEF, the International Labour Organization and the Bureau national pour la démobilisation et la réinsertion participated in planning for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of vulnerable groups. Several workshops and seminars were organized by UNICEF in Kinshasa concerning the demobilization and reinsertion of child soldiers, as part of the sensitization campaign launched by President Kabila. Following acts of violence against street children in Kinshasa, MONUC and UNICEF met with the Minister for Social Affairs and Family to attempt to develop a comprehensive strategy to address the large numbers of street children in Kinshasa and other provincial cities.

57. MONUC continues to receive reports of recruitment and training of children especially in the east of the country by all of the groups. Moreover, despite some verbal understandings, militia groups have yet to express their full commitment to halting the recruitment of children.

VII. HIV/AIDS

58. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1308 (2000), the MONUC health cell has been assigned specific responsibilities for the prevention of HIV/AIDS. To date, MONUC has elaborated a prevention programme based on a permanent information and education campaign and the free distribution of condoms. This programme will be integrated into UNAIDS programmes.

VIII. Next steps

Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration

59. MONUC has nearly completed the second phase of its deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and is now faced with the challenges of the third phase. The main tasks to be accomplished by the parties and requiring the assistance of MONUC during that phase include the total withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the disarmament and demobilization of the armed groups. It will also be necessary to find durable solutions to the problem of the armed groups, including the repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants into society.

60. During my meetings with Presidents Kabila and Kagame, I highlighted the steps necessary to make progress in this area. Clearly, the problem of the armed groups cannot be solved by force. The objective of the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme is therefore to create an environment, especially in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which will encourage the combatants and their families to take a step towards a better life without weapons.

61. The vital elements of such an environment would be continuing adherence to the ceasefire and the cessation of military assistance to the armed groups. It
would also be essential that all parties extend their full cooperation to MONUC, especially when it deploys eastwards to the region where most armed groups operate. Without such cooperation and the necessary transparency by the parties in exchanging information on the armed groups, MONUC would not be in a position to assess the scope of the problem and define the extent of its assistance to the process.

62. In addition to an environment conducive to a successful disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme, it would be important for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to continue their dialogue, which should lead to a firm political understanding on the disarmament to reintegration process and the establishment of a joint coordination mechanism. Such a mechanism would serve as a useful partner for the international community and enable it to support the process through practical assistance and funding. It is encouraging that both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda have set up national mechanisms. What is needed, however, is a joint approach that would ensure fully coordinated planning and, subsequently, a seamless transition from disarmament to repatriation, reinsertion and reintegration.

63. The objective would be to repatriate Rwandan former combatants to Rwanda as soon as possible after they are disarmed, rather than accommodating them for long periods in camps on Congolese territory. Screening of ex-combatants would largely be organized by the host country with the support of the United Nations. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that some members of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe part in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. At the same time, however, a majority of armed group members in the east are not wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and many may be seeking ways of returning home to resume their lives in peace.

64. The United Nations has discussed with the Government of Rwanda means of pursuing this approach in close cooperation with donors, in order to encourage the combatants to return to their own country in conditions of safety and security, and with full respect for due process, which may include traditional methods of settling disputes. During my visit to Kigali, President Kagame reiterated his Government’s willingness to accept the repatriation of Rwandan combatants now in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The United Nations would be prepared to assist in seeking the considerable donor funding needed to support the Rwandan institutions responsible for carrying out reinsertion and reintegration.

65. In preparing for activities relating to the disarmament to reintegration process, it must be recalled that the armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo did not sign the Lusaka Agreement and continue to take part in armed hostilities. Relatively few details are known about their activities and intentions. MONUC has had almost no contact with their leaders. It will be necessary to continue to gather as much information about them as possible as deployment proceeds. I expect the parties to assist MONUC in the gathering of such information.

66. While the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegrations of Rwandan armed groups on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains a vital element of the peace process, there are also armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo for whom political solutions need to be found as early as possible. Such groups include the Mayi-Mayi, ethnic-based Congolese militias and Burundian rebels.

Role of the United Nations

67. It is currently envisaged that the main role of MONUC in phase III would be to establish temporary reception centres where combatants could surrender their weapons, to be destroyed by MONUC in situ. The disarmed combatants would then undergo the first stages of demobilization. MONUC anticipates that many combatants will be accompanied by their dependants. It is therefore important that arrangements be made, in close coordination with United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, to meet the immediate needs of the women and children accompanying the combatants.

68. As stated above, MONUC would anticipate conducting only the initial stages of demobilization on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo before the disarmed combatants are transported back to Rwanda for reinsertion and reintegration. During those initial stages, at the reception centres, MONUC and the humanitarian agencies would facilitate the provision to the combatants and their dependants of civilian clothing; ablutions facilities; a medical examination and medical treatment if needed; and food and camp-
style accommodation for the period of their stay, which
should be as short as possible.

69. In cooperation with the Government of Rwanda,
MONUC would also anticipate sending, in due course,
human rights and public information officers to
Rwanda to make regular visits to the reinsertion camps.
Part of the MONUC public information campaign in
phase III would involve persuading the combatants in
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that the
Government of Rwanda was prepared to accept most of
them back with full regard for due process.

Coordination

70. While MONUC is ready to assume a coordinating
role in organizing the disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration effort, it has
neither the means nor the mandate to undertake many
of the practical tasks associated with it (camp
management, medical support, provision of food, water
and sanitation, reintegration projects etc.) For this,
MONUC will need to rely on United Nations
programmes and agencies, the World Bank and non-
governmental organizations support, and is setting up a
consultative mechanism in Kinshasa with all
stakeholders. A similar mechanism will be established
at United Nations Headquarters to reinforce the
existing Planning and Management Task Force chaired
by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping
Operations.

71. The World Bank, in consultation with the United
Nations, Governments in the region, donors and other
partners, is currently working towards the
establishment of a multi-country programme of
demobilization and reintegration in the Great Lakes
region. A World Bank team held talks with the
Government of Rwanda in connection with this
initiative. The aims of such an umbrella programme
include substantive exchanges between country
projects in the region and a consistent approach to the
needs of the countries involved. The World Bank and
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
are seeking financial contributions and technical
support from donors and United Nations partners in the
process. A number of donors have already pledged
financial support and others are expected to do so
shortly.

72. In order to contribute to a better understanding of
the problems relating to disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration, UNDP led
a mapping and programming mission to Burundi, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and
Uganda from 6 August to 13 September 2001.
MONUC and UNDP need to continue to work closely
together, in view of the many infrastructural and
development tasks which are directly relevant to the
peace process and to ensure that the reintegration
aspects of the process are adequately addressed at an
early stage. MONUC is setting up an integrated unit for
dismament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration, which will play a catalytic and
coordinating role and form the core of a consultative
mechanism involving United Nations organizations and
programmes, the World Bank, bilateral donors and non-
governmental organizations.

Step-by-step deployment

73. The United Nations is determined to do what it
can to maintain the momentum in the peace process,
including further deployments of MONUC into the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The overall
security situation in the eastern part of the country and
the logistical constraints of deploying them are such
that MONUC has no choice but to adopt a step-by-step
approach. It will have to assess carefully before each
step developments in the security situation and the
political climate. In addition, it should ensure at all
times that it can provide an adequate level of logistical
support to United Nations peacekeepers in the field.

74. The Mission's initial objective in phase III would
be to establish a mixed civilian and military presence,
as well as a forward support base, in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. This would
probably contribute, as it has in other areas where
MONUC has deployed, to a sense of security among
the population and to a progressive resumption of
economic and social activity in that part of the country.
In addition, it would provide MONUC with the
necessary access and information to start and support a
process of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
resettlement and reintegration.

75. The proposed operational and logistics base
would be established at Kindu, which is located at the
western fringe of an area characterized by many of the
military, security, political and humanitarian and
human rights problems that MONUC is likely to be
confronted with in phase III. Kindu would thus serve,
together with the existing MONUC bases at Kalemie
and Goma, as the main hub for activities within the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The initial deployment of United Nations personnel at Kindu would include a military engineering capability, accompanied by a protection unit, to prepare for possible further expansions of the Mission in the east. It would also be necessary to progressively deploy civilian staff, including political, humanitarian, human rights, public information and child protection personnel, and members of the Mission's disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration unit. In addition to the deployment to Kindu, MONUC should also be prepared eventually to strengthen significantly both its presence (up to two infantry battalions) and civilian elements in Kisangani, as soon as the city is demilitarized by RCD.

76. The location of Kindu was selected for various political, security and logistical considerations. To ensure that the MONUC deployment there can be supported properly and at a reasonable cost, it would be important to rehabilitate as soon as possible the rail/river link between Kisangani and Kindu. Until surface transportation links are established, the deployment and sustainment of the United Nations presence at Kindu will be done by air, which significantly limits the United Nations ability to deploy a sizeable force, and also involves significant costs.

77. Once MONUC has commenced operations at Kindu and in surrounding areas, it would be able, subject to the full cooperation of the parties, to assist in the disarmament and demobilization of the armed groups. Because of the voluntary nature of the exercise, those operations can commence only when the necessary political and security conditions have been created by the parties and when it is judged that the armed groups are ready to undergo disarmament and demobilization. I intend to make the necessary recommendations to the Security Council at the appropriate time, including an estimate of the additional resources that would be required.

Concept of operations

78. In the meantime, the implementation of the proposal to deploy at Kindu will require the gradual establishment of a forward force headquarters and infantry and engineer units, with an initial strength of up to 400 all ranks. This initial group, some elements of which would be redeployed from existing MONUC positions, will have specific responsibility for establishing the necessary infrastructure for subsequent deployments. It will be stationed at the airport of Kindu. If authorized, this initial deployment could be completed by the beginning of 2002. At that point, the Mission's total military strength would be at about 3,800 all ranks.

79. During the early stages of phase III, the military component will have the following tasks:

   (a) To prepare for planned future deployments;
   (b) To enhance the security of United Nations personnel and assets;
   (c) To investigate allegations of ceasefire violations, including those committed by armed groups;
   (d) To gather and analyse information, particularly concerning the location, numbers, movements, activities and motivations of the armed groups and their dependants;
   (e) To establish and maintain contacts with local authorities, including traditional authorities and, eventually, with the leadership of the armed groups and their dependants;
   (f) To encourage and facilitate early disarmament and demobilization;
   (g) To conduct confidence-building activities.

80. A risk assessment has been performed, taking into account the likely threat from a number of sources, including foreign armed groups, foreign regular forces, Congolese armed groups, hostage-taking, landmines, terrain, weather and health risks. The military force to be deployed at Kindu in due course will need to be sufficiently robust. Accordingly, it is envisaged to expand the initial deployment of 400 military personnel gradually to a task force of some 1,100 to 1,200 troops comprising a headquarters unit, an infantry battalion and an aviation regiment, plus a forward force support unit of about 800 all ranks. The aviation regiment would be equipped with enough aircraft, including armed helicopters, to airlift a 120-strong infantry company and its equipment in a single lift. The infantry battalion group would comprise four rifle companies, mortar and anti-tank platoons, and headquarters, signals and other operational units, as well as transport, medical, maintenance and catering personnel. In due course, the total military strength at Kindu would thus be around 2,000 personnel.
81. A number of specialized units would also be deployed at Kindu, including engineering; railway repair; riverine and ferry services; transportation, water production and signals, together with a guard unit. Additional military observer teams numbering about 48 men (12 four-officer teams) will also be based at Kindu. Subject to authorization by the Security Council and a favourable response on the part of troop-contributing countries, it is envisaged that this gradual deployment will be completed in the course of 2002.

82. Operating within the vicinity of United Nations forces at Kindu, Kalembé and Goma, MONUC civilian personnel would work with the local population and the local authorities to increase humanitarian access; draw attention to human rights problems in an effort to dissipate the climate of impunity that is widespread in the east; gather information about and make initial contact with the armed groups and their dependants; keep the local population informed, through radio broadcasts, about the nature, activities and intentions of MONUC; and refine planning and preparations for the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups, including child soldiers.

83. The creation of an enabling environment by the parties is a crucial condition for the forward deployment of MONUC. In this regard, I should like to once again emphasize the responsibility of the parties for the security of United Nations personnel and their freedom of movement. Without these elements in place, MONUC cannot do its work. The Mission has already received general assurances from RCD regarding its deployment to Kindu. It is hoped that further and more detailed assurances will be given by RCD and other parties as MONUC expands its presence in the areas under their control.

**Civilian police**

84. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1341 (2001), arrangements are being made to deploy a small contingent of up to 15 civilian police officers to MONUC headquarters. The primary tasks of the civilian police component during this initial phase will be to develop contacts with the internal security and police organs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to plan and recommend options for an expanded civilian police component. United Nations civilian police will also prepare options for a possible role in Kisangani.

85. In preparation for the planned deployment, civilian police experts conducted a field visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August during which they met with senior Government and police officials. The Government stated that it would welcome a civilian police deployment and requested professional police advice to help it to re-establish law and order throughout the country.

**Public information**

86. The public information component of MONUC is being expanded to prepare for the establishment of a United Nations radio network capable of broadcasting to the entire country. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has recently concluded a memorandum of understanding for this purpose with the Fondation Hirondelle, a Swiss non-governmental organization. Both the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and RCD-Goma have agreed to support this initiative. FM transmitters and production studios are to be installed at Kinshasa, Kisangani, Mbandaka, Kananga, Kalembé and Goma. A shortwave transmitter will also be installed at Kinshasa. Programming will be transmitted by satellite to the regional stations, which will produce content for local broadcasts. The first transmitter in Kinshasa is expected to be operational by the end of 2001, and the entire network should be completed by the end of May 2002.

87. The radio will provide accurate, credible and impartial information about all aspects of the peace process, including military and political developments, the inter-Congolese dialogue and the many humanitarian assistance programmes operating in the country. As the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo grow to trust this source of information, it is expected that their understanding of and support for the peace process will deepen, thereby facilitating the work of the mission.

**IX. Financial aspects**

88. The General Assembly, by its resolution 55/275 of 14 June 2001, appropriated an initial amount of $200 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2001 pending submission of my proposed budget for the Mission for the full 12-month financial period ending 30 June 2002.
89. My proposed budget for MONUC is in preparation and will take full account of the significant additional resource requirements arising from the concept of operations outlined in this report, should the Security Council authorize MONUC to enter phase III of its deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I shall request the General Assembly to take action on the budget during its fifty-sixth session.

90. Since its establishment in October 1999, the Trust Fund to support the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has received voluntary contributions amounting to $1.1 million, with expenditures authorized to date in the amount of $0.4 million.

91. As at 30 September 2001, unpaid assessed contributions to the MONUC special account amounted to $246.9 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $3,291.9 million.

X. Observations

92. Despite difficulties, the overall situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to be favourable. The ceasefire along the confrontation line has held since January. The disengagement of forces and their redeployment to new defensive positions is almost complete, and some foreign forces have been withdrawn from the country.

93. The dangerous and persistent outbreaks of fighting in the east are very disturbing, however. During my visit to the region in September, I urged Presidents Kabila and Kagame to exert all their influence to bring the fighting to an end. Although much of the fighting in the east is attributed to armed groups, I strongly believe that much more can and should be done by the signatories of the Lusaka Agreement to stop it. Any military and logistical support provided to those armed groups should cease without delay. The proposals I have outlined above can be carried out only if the parties continue to demonstrate their commitment to the peace process and work with MONUC to establish a climate conducive to a complete cessation of hostilities.

94. At the same time, I welcome the withdrawal of Namibian and many of the Ugandan troops from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Namibia is the first signatory of the Lusaka Agreement to withdraw its forces in accordance with the Agreement. I encourage Uganda to complete the repatriation of its remaining forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I also urge Rwanda and other Governments concerned to accelerate their preparations to withdraw their troops, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1304 (2000).

95. The Government of Rwanda has declared that it is prepared to reinsert Rwandan former combatants into society in their own country. This would make a significant contribution to the process of healing the deep wounds caused by the genocide seven years ago. The United Nations stands ready to assist in this process.

96. I commend the neutral facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue and his team for the remarkable success of the preparatory meeting held at Gaborone from 20 to 24 August. I earnestly hope that the formal commencement of the dialogue in Addis Ababa will enable the Congolese parties, including political parties and civil society, to address the key questions that need to be answered as they contemplate a return to peace: national reconciliation, the nature of governance in their country, relations with their neighbours to the east and to the south, and relations between different communities within the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself. I trust that the parties concerned will ensure an adequate representation of Congolese women in the dialogue.

97. The most important tasks, however, still lie ahead. The Congolese parties must demonstrate their continuing commitment to the dialogue and cooperate fully with the facilitator and his team. At the same time, the support and assistance of the international community will continue to be needed.

98. Accordingly, to sustain the momentum in the peace process it is recommended that the Security Council authorize MONUC to enter phase III of its deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in accordance with the concept of operations outlined in paragraphs 59 to 87 above. The initial deployment of MONUC troops in Kinshasa will remain within the limit of 5,537 military personnel authorized by the Council in resolution 1291 (2000). Preparations are under way for recruitment and deployment of adequate numbers of United Nations civilian personnel to accompany the military deployment, including political, human rights, humanitarian, child protection, public information,
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and logistical personnel.

99. In making these recommendations, I am fully aware of the political and security risks and high financial costs involved in the next steps necessary to keep the peace process moving forward in a decisive manner. However, it is my sincere belief that the international community will be willing to take these steps, despite the associated risks and costs, in the expectation that the parties to the conflicts, both inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo and within the region, will fully shoulder their moral and political responsibilities to end the suffering of the population, which has gone on too long. In particular, the parties to the Lusaka Agreement must engage in a genuine and constructive dialogue. Their performance will obviously be a factor in the pace of United Nations deployment forward and in the contribution it can make. In this respect, I also count on the continuing support of interested Member States to encourage, assist and, where necessary, prod the parties to pursue the peace process resolutely.

100. The need to advance the peace process and to end the fighting is all the more pressing as serious human rights violations continue to occur, and humanitarian conditions for millions of Congolese and in the whole region very often remain extremely poor. I call upon the Governments in the region to explore new and bold steps, which would promote human rights, good governance, national reconciliation, movement towards democracy, and social and economic recovery.

101. Significant practical assistance and funding will also be required for peace-related operations within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, not least for the rehabilitation of the vital surface transportation links described in this report. I note that some major donors have already begun to express interest in evaluating and financing these projects which, taken together, would ultimately reconnect the deep interior of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and, in a wider sense, with the rest of the world. The pressing issue of the demilitarization of Kisangani remains a key objective of the international community, and its realization would also greatly contribute to the revitalization of Congolese society and economy.

102. The challenges ahead and their complexity will require that the United Nations organizations and programmes, as well as the Bretton Woods institutions, enhance their coordination and assist each other's efforts in practical ways. I intend to strengthen the existing cooperation between those entities, with a view to achieving a precise division of labour in the Great Lakes region. Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration and the rehabilitation of infrastructure are inextricably linked to the peace process and, therefore, pose new challenges of coordination for the international community.

103. In recognition of the complex situation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Burundian armed groups form an intricate part of the military and political landscape, as well as of the obvious links that exist between some aspects of the Lusaka process and events in Burundi, I believe the time has come for the parties to the Lusaka process to explore means of associating Burundi more closely with the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

104. Finally, I wish to express my deep appreciation to my former Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kamel Morjane, for all his achievements at the head of MONUC, and to wish him every success in his new responsibilities. I also express my thanks to the Force Commander, General Mountaga Diallo, and my full confidence in my new Special Representative, Namanga Ngongi, as he sets about his important tasks. My appreciation also goes to all the women and men of MONUC, both military and civilian, for the contribution they continue to make to the restoration of peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Annex

United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: current strength and contributing countries

(as at 15 October 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military observers</th>
<th>Staff officers</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Military observers</td>
<td>Staff officers</td>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>397</strong></td>
<td><strong>143</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,868</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,408</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>