



Security Council

Distr.: General
10 September 2002

Original: English

Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council of 15 August (S/PRST/2002/24), in which the Council requested me to put forward recommendations on how the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and, through the Mission's coordination, all relevant United Nations agencies can assist the parties in the fulfilment of their responsibilities to implement the Peace Agreement between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda on the Withdrawal of the Rwandan Troops from the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe Forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2002/914, annex), signed in Pretoria on 30 July 2002.

2. The present report outlines the tasks associated with the Pretoria Agreement and contains recommendations on action that the United Nations could take to assist the parties in its implementation. It also contains an analysis of the Agreement between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Uganda on the Withdrawal of Ugandan Troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cooperation and Normalization of Relations between the Two Countries, signed by the States concerned in Luanda on 6 September. In addition, the report describes the situation in the north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and sets forth recommendations on action that the United Nations could take in this regard.

3. Other developments since the issuance of my eleventh report on MONUC (S/2002/621) will be reflected in a further report, which will be submitted to the Security Council in early October.

II. Provisions of the Agreements and action taken to date

A. Pretoria Agreement

4. In Pretoria on 30 July 2002, the Heads of State of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda signed the Peace Agreement on the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the dismantling of the former Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR) and Interahamwe forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The President of the Republic of South Africa and I signed the Agreement as witnesses.

5. Key provisions of the Agreement relate to the undertaking of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Government to continue the process of "tracking down and disarming" (S/2002/914, annex, para. 8.1) the Interahamwe and ex-FAR within the territory under its control. The Democratic Republic of the Congo Government has also agreed to collaborate with MONUC, the Joint Military Commission (JMC) and "any other force constituted by the third party, to assemble and disarm the ex-FAR and Interahamwe" (ibid., para. 7) in the whole of the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Government of Rwanda, for its part, has committed itself to withdrawing its troops from the Democratic Republic

of the Congo “as soon as effective measures that address its security concerns, in particular the dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces, have been agreed to” (ibid., para. 5). The Agreement stipulates that Rwanda’s withdrawal should start simultaneously with the implementation of these two measures, both of which will be verified by MONUC, JMC and the third party.

6. The third party — which is defined as “the Secretary-General of the United Nations and South Africa, in its dual capacity as Chairperson of the African Union and as facilitator” (ibid., p. 4) — is entrusted with a number of verification tasks, including the verification of information to be provided by the parties on the armed groups, and of the implementation of effective measures in regard to their dismantling. MONUC is specifically called on to immediately complete its phase III deployment and to operationalize and provide security at assembly points for ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements, as well as to facilitate their repatriation.

7. The Programme of Implementation of the Peace Agreement (ibid., pp. 4-6) envisages a 90-day timetable and includes the following elements:

(a) The establishment of a third-party verification mechanism;

(b) The finalization of MONUC phase III deployment;

(c) The establishment of assembly points for ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements;

(d) The tracking down, disarming and dismantling of those armed groups;

(e) Various monitoring and verification tasks;

(f) The complete withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Democratic Republic of the Congo territory.

Subsequently, the third party is to conduct the final verification of the completion of the 90-day Programme of Implementation and submit a report within 30 days thereafter.

Action taken to date

8. Following the signing of the Pretoria Agreement, the United Nations undertook consultations with the Governments of South Africa, the Democratic Republic

of the Congo and Rwanda in order to gain greater insight into the background to the Agreement and to seek the clarifications necessary for the Organization to plan its role in support of the Agreement. Several meetings were held with delegations from the three countries during the week of 5 August 2002. Additional clarifications were provided on 8 August at the meeting that the Security Council held with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of South Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Special Envoy of the President of Rwanda on the Great Lakes region. On 6 August, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations provided the Security Council with a preliminary analysis of the implications of the Pretoria Agreement.

9. On 9 August, following consultations with a South African Government delegation at United Nations Headquarters, a joint communiqué was issued in New York on the establishment of a secretariat of the third-party verification mechanism. That communiqué indicated the readiness of the United Nations and South Africa to work closely together to oversee and verify the implementation of the commitments made by both signatories. The communiqué also announced that the secretariat of the verification mechanism would comprise the following personnel, to be assisted as required by the necessary experts: for the United Nations, my Deputy Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Deputy Force Commander of MONUC; and for South Africa, the Security Adviser to the President, the Foreign Affairs Adviser to the President, the Chief Director for Central Africa of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Special Representative of the Department of Defence.

10. Subsequently, the secretariat of the third-party verification mechanism was established in Kinshasa. It will also have a liaison group in Kigali. MONUC intends to extend its fullest cooperation to the verification mechanism by, inter alia, assisting in carrying out the latter’s verification tasks. At the same time, MONUC will continue to discharge the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council, in accordance with its established chain of command and procedures. The terms of reference for the verification mechanism are in the process of being finalized.

11. The third-party verification mechanism held its first meeting in Kinshasa on 21 August and discussed its programme of work and rules of procedure. It also

held initial meetings with the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda on 26 and 27 August to discuss the way forward and to request that they appoint contact groups to serve as their primary interlocutors vis-à-vis the verification mechanism. The mechanism will determine in due course specific modalities for the various verification tasks envisaged in the Pretoria Agreement.

12. In the course of my recent visit to southern Africa, I conducted extensive consultations with regional leaders on the various practical modalities for the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.

13. Since the signing of the Agreement, the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda have maintained regular contacts to discuss its implementation. The Government of Rwanda has provided the third-party verification mechanism with initial information on its plan for the withdrawal of its troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as information concerning the Rwandan armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, a preliminary assessment of these documents has indicated that much more information is required in these areas. The verification mechanism, in the meantime, is also awaiting the Democratic Republic of the Congo Government's submission of information concerning the ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements allegedly present in the western Democratic Republic of the Congo, including, in particular, information on the whereabouts of their known leaders.

B. Luanda Agreement

14. On 6 September 2002, at Luanda, the Heads of State of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Uganda signed an Agreement on the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and cooperation and normalization of relations between the two countries. The Head of State of Angola signed the Agreement as a witness.

15. Under the Agreement, the Government of Uganda committed itself to the continued withdrawal of its forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in accordance with a jointly agreed calendar. In particular, the Ugandan troops are to immediately withdraw from Gbadolite, Beni and their vicinities. Uganda also

reaffirmed its readiness to withdraw its troops from Bunia following the establishment of an administrative authority in Ituri. The agreement also stipulates that Ugandan troops on the slopes of Mount Ruwenzori will remain until the parties put in place "security mechanisms guaranteeing Uganda's security", including coordinated patrols along the common border of the two countries.

16. With regard to the situation in Ituri, the two parties have agreed to establish, with the assistance of MONUC, a Joint Pacification Committee on Ituri comprising representatives of the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda and various leaders on the ground. According to the implementation calendar annexed to the Agreement, the Committee would be established within 20 days of the signing of the Agreement. Following a decision on a mechanism to maintain law and order in Ituri, an administrative authority would be set up. Subsequently, Uganda would develop a plan for withdrawal from Bunia that would envisage the completion of the withdrawal of the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) within 100 days.

17. Other provisions of the Agreement concern the normalization of relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, including through the restoration of the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while Uganda's security concerns are also addressed; by refraining from all types of military and logistical support to the armed groups; by expediting the pacification of the Democratic Republic of the Congo territories currently under Ugandan control and the normalization of the situation along the common border between the two countries; through exchanges of intelligence on all matters of security interest; by restoring full diplomatic relations; and by re-establishing the Joint Ministerial Commission for cooperation in various areas, including defence, security, trade, investment, infrastructure, transport, communications and cultural exchanges. The parties also agreed to resolve any future differences between them through dialogue and other peaceful means.

18. At the time of the preparation of this report, the Government of Uganda had withdrawn some 1,200 troops from Beni and 650 troops from Gbadolite since late August. MONUC has observed the return of these UPDF troops to Uganda. It is expected that the

withdrawal of Ugandan troops from those locations will be completed by the end of September.

III. Implementation challenges

A. Pretoria Agreement

19. The signing of the Pretoria Agreement has been characterized by the parties and the facilitator as an effort to overcome the main obstacles to the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815, annex), namely, the lack of progress in the withdrawal of Rwandan troops and in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Hence, it provides a political framework within which the main issues of concern could be addressed, thus enabling the parties to resolve their long-standing conflict.

20. It is in this context that the MONUC concept of operations for phase III has been revised, as outlined in section IV below, to reflect the adjustments necessary to support the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, including the various verification tasks envisaged for the third-party verification mechanism and voluntary, progressive disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of the armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with an emphasis on the ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements.

21. The key to operationalizing the Pretoria Agreement will be the continued resolve of both parties to work closely with each other — with the assistance of the third party — in a climate of confidence. It is only in this context that a number of continuing differences — such as the divergence of views between the two Governments on the number and locations of the Rwandan armed groups and on the yet-to-be-defined “effective measures” (S/2002/914, annex, para. 5) regarding the dismantling of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe — can be overcome. It will also be important for the parties to reach — as soon as possible — a common understanding on their obligations under the Agreement. President Mbeki’s proposal of monthly, or at least regular, review meetings at the Head of State level should therefore be strongly supported, since such meetings would be an

essential instrument in maintaining the resolve of the parties and ensuring that the process remains on track.

22. The continuing contacts between the parties since the signing of the Pretoria Agreement are encouraging signs of their commitment to the peace process. At the same time, the reported intensification of military activity on the ground and a recent exchange of public accusations regarding non-compliance with the Agreement may not be conducive to the prompt implementation of the Agreement. While the cessation of hostilities between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda has largely held along the disengagement line for some time, it will be crucial for the parties to demonstrate their commitment to the Pretoria Agreement by ensuring that secure conditions are created both for MONUC’s deployment and for the voluntary disarmament of the armed groups. The parties will also need to exert influence over those concerned to lay down their arms and enter into a voluntary disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration process.

23. Although not directly linked to the Pretoria Agreement, an overall political settlement among the parties to the inter-Congolese dialogue is also a critical element for ensuring its successful implementation. An all-inclusive transitional Government should be in a position to effectively extend its authority throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo, following the withdrawal of foreign forces. Obviously, the ongoing efforts of my Special Envoy, Mustapha Niasse, require the strong support of all concerned, with a view to a timely, all-inclusive agreement among the Congolese parties on the transitional arrangements.

B. Luanda Agreement

24. The Agreement reached between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda provides for the total withdrawal of the latter’s troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the normalization of the relations between the two countries. As regards Bunia, a key town in the resource-rich Ituri region that was until recently a political hub for the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Kisangani/Mouvement de libération (RCD-K/ML) in an acutely contested territory, Uganda’s decision to withdraw its battalion from this area once

an administrative authority has been established in Ituri could have both positive and negative consequences.

25. As indicated in my previous reports to the Security Council, Ituri has for decades been afflicted by a series of violent clashes, particularly between the Lendu, the Hema and their affiliated groups. It should be noted, however, that the Lendu-Hema tension does not represent a typical majority-minority conflict as witnessed elsewhere. Since June 1999, the tension in Ituri has reached an unprecedented level, with — according to the Democratic Republic of the Congo Government — up to 20,000 people having lost their lives. Recently, in the whole of Ituri, which has a population of 4.6 million, some 500,000 people were newly displaced, with 60,000 displaced in Bunia alone. The precarious security situation was vividly illustrated by the assassination in April 2001 of six International Committee of the Red Cross workers by unidentified assailants some 30 kilometres from Bunia, which is speculated to have been an effort to keep the eyes and ears of the international community away from the situation there.

26. The ongoing extreme violence is often attributed to a lack of impartial administration; to the power struggle between the leaders of the RCD-K/ML; to rivalry between prominent business people over economic interests; to perceived or real interference by some UPDF elements on the ground; and to ongoing efforts to build up ethnically based militias by various sponsors who have different political, military and economic motivations.

27. The total number of killings in Ituri in recent weeks is impossible to ascertain. It is widely accepted that in Bunia itself there have been hundreds, but as the violence has increased and spread to villages as far as 90 kilometres from Bunia, figures provided by non-governmental organizations and other sources have suggested that thousands may have died in August alone, with tens of thousands displaced, although it has not been possible to confirm these figures independently. A recently well-supplied Hema/Gerere militia group, the Union des patriotes congolais (UPC), has reportedly captured important towns on the Mahagi-Bunia-Beni axis, establishing its control of the immediate environs of Bunia, thereby reducing the RCD-K/ML power base. The Lendu and Hema communities are now deeply suspicious of each other and have entered a deadly cycle of revenge killings. In recent months, individuals who have reportedly sought

to restore normalcy have received death threats, forcing them to flee the area.

28. On 29 August, the Human Rights Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Luaba Ntumba, and his associates, were abducted by a group of UPC militia members near the Bunia airport. The hostages were released three days later in exchange for the return to Bunia of nine associates of the UPC leader, Thomas Lubanga, who was formerly an RCD-K/ML leader in charge of the movement's "defence portfolio". MONUC assisted in this situation by providing good offices and appealing to all concerned to reach a peaceful solution.

29. While any long-term solution must be based on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the area and the introduction of a legitimate national authority that will exercise impartially its civil administration responsibility, it is unlikely that such an administration — acceptable to all communities in Bunia — can be effectively installed at short notice. Despite a general perception that some UPDF troops have not acted even-handedly, for the time being they remain the only force in Bunia that can provide security, albeit limited and localized. It should also be noted that the situation in the north-east has been further destabilized by a military offensive conducted by RCD-National, reportedly backed by the Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC), towards Isiro. RCD-National has reportedly advanced to within 200 kilometres of Bunia.

30. The need to address the deteriorating situation in Bunia is critical not only for the implementation of the Luanda Agreement, but also for the normalization of security conditions in the north-east and the furtherance of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in general. The proposed MONUC role in this regard is outlined in paragraphs 57-63 below.

IV. Role of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in support of the Agreements

31. My ninth report to the Security Council (S/2001/970) presented the initial plan of MONUC for its phase III deployment, which indicated that the

Mission would take a step-by-step approach to the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of the armed groups while continuing with relevant phase II tasks, in particular monitoring the disengagement of the parties to new defensive positions, investigating alleged ceasefire violations and observing the withdrawal of foreign forces.

32. Over the past year, MONUC has made considerable strides in its phase II activities, but also in preparing for its phase III tasks, in particular by deploying civilian and military personnel in Kindu and Kisangani. In this regard, the preliminary information gathered on the armed groups was provided to the Security Council in the annex to my letter of 1 April 2002 (S/2002/341). However, in the absence of an overall political agreement on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration and without a cessation of hostilities in the eastern parts of the country, the Mission has not been able to achieve much with regard to disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration beyond providing assistance in response to ad hoc requests for demobilization and repatriation of combatants such as those assembled in Kamina and Beni, and planning for the wider disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration operation.

33. The Pretoria and Luanda Agreements, which support the principles laid down in the Lusaka Agreement, now provide a concrete opportunity to move forward with the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of armed groups and the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces.

A. Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration

1. Principles involved in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of foreign armed groups

34. The main principles that will guide MONUC involvement in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of foreign armed groups are as follows:

(a) The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda must provide all information they possess on the locations, numbers, and weaponry of the armed groups, to be verified by the third-party verification mechanism;

(b) Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration activities will take place in a permissive environment, which is to say, a cessation of all hostilities is necessary;

(c) The disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of armed groups will be undertaken on a voluntary basis. MONUC will in no way attempt to forcibly disarm combatants;

(d) The disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration process will also address the voluntary repatriation of both ex-combatants and their family members. It is essential that the countries in question provide guarantees that ex-combatants and their dependants will be able to return in conditions of safety and security. In this respect, the necessary confidence-building measures, including international monitoring and reintegration assistance, will have to be put in place. Consideration should also be given to members of "mixed families" (such as Rwandan ex-combatants who have Congolese wives);

(e) The question of ex-combatants who may not wish to return to their home countries must be addressed prior to the commencement of the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration exercise. MONUC and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will undertake further consultations with the parties, as well as with other Governments, on the identification of various durable solutions, including asylum in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and resettlement to third countries, for those people who qualify as refugees and are unwilling to return to their home countries;

(f) MONUC and UNHCR will seek to work with the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, as well as with other countries concerned, to ensure that those two Governments make available to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other

Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 any persons sought by the Tribunal;

(g) In areas not under the control of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Government, MONUC will provide “point security” for the disarmament and demobilization sites, but the local authorities will continue to be responsible for providing overall “umbrella security”. In areas controlled by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Government will be expected to provide security at the disarmament and demobilization sites;

(h) A clear understanding should be reached with the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda on their respective roles and responsibilities, as well as those of MONUC, UNHCR and other relevant United Nations agencies, with regard to disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants and associated tasks.

2. Envisaged disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration arrangements

35. In areas controlled by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, any ex-FAR or Interahamwe members identified as operating alongside the Congolese armed forces would remain in their formations until they were, as was the case in Kamina, disarmed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo Government, where they would be screened, demobilized and repatriated by MONUC. The Congolese armed forces would be responsible for maintaining security during the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration exercise. MONUC would not be required to provide protection, beyond guard units necessary to protect United Nations personnel and equipment. Accordingly, it will be possible for MONUC to proceed with the initial stages of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration within its current resources in the areas under Government control as soon as the ex-FAR/Interahamwe are identified.

36. In the east, disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration will continue to present a major political, security and

logistical challenge. As noted in my previous reports, the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo remains highly volatile. The general environment of hostility and the lack of law and order are likely to remain, even with a formal cessation of hostilities. In this light, it is proposed that the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration process in the east would initially commence in areas of relative security.

37. The proposed disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration plan envisages that MONUC will simultaneously operate two to four mobile reception centres for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration at any given time. It is estimated that a total of 10 to 12 mobile reception centres could be created during the entire process. These centres would be set up by MONUC in partnership with UNHCR, the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). In addition to the military presence of MONUC, including military observers, a multidisciplinary civilian team would also be attached to each centre.

38. Following consultations with United Nations agencies, it has been agreed in principle that UNHCR will assist in the reception and repatriation of ex-combatants’ dependants, who will be accommodated at a separate camp. WFP will provide and distribute food, UNICEF will assist with the child soldiers and WHO will support the provision of medical services. MONUC and the United Nations agencies will also work in close partnership with non-governmental organizations that may assist the process. In this connection, specialized training in child protection and gender issues will be provided to civilians and military personnel who will be involved in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration process.

39. According to preliminary estimates, it could take about two months to establish one mobile centre, two months to process the combatants and their dependants there and one month to disassemble the camp. The total caseload, including dependants, could be as high as 90,000. MONUC estimates that, with the assistance of its implementation partners, it could repatriate up to 200 people per day from each reception centre and that up to 7,000 people would be processed at each centre over a two-month period, depending on location and logistical conditions.

40. The extensive use of the Mission's public information capacities will be essential in disseminating information on the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration process. MONUC will step up the use of Radio Okapi to broadcast information on Rwanda's policy on the issue of returning ex-combatants who have already been repatriated, in order to further encourage combatants to disarm and repatriate. In so doing, it will continue to broadcast from already established bases in Kindu and Kisangani and use its three mobile FM radio transmitters.

B. Overall framework for phase III activities

41. As envisaged in the Pretoria Agreement, the third-party verification mechanism will verify the information provided by the parties on armed groups. Moreover, the verification mechanism will play a vital role in overcoming any potential stumbling blocks in the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement by making a final determination on the measures taken vis-à-vis the dismantling of armed groups. While MONUC is a separate entity, it is expected to serve as the main operational arm of the verification mechanism in regard to its verification tasks. Other bodies, such as the JMC, will be invited to participate in the activities of the verification mechanism, as appropriate, pursuant to the Pretoria Agreement.

42. The role of the third-party verification mechanism in verifying the cessation of support to armed groups will be particularly important, as this is understood to be an essential element of the "effective measures" aimed at dismantling the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. To assist in this endeavour, MONUC is expected to establish an observation presence at key points on the alleged supply routes, including at Ndjili airport and at Kamina and Lubumbashi airfields. The verification mechanism will also work with both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwandan Governments to identify leaders of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, with a view to establishing their whereabouts and handing them over to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (see also para. 34 (f) above).

43. The structure of MONUC — both civilian and military — would be adjusted in order to meet the challenges that the Mission will face in the coming

phase. A joint coordination committee for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration, of which the current disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration division will form the core, would be set up directly under the responsibility of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The coordination committee would include the various components of MONUC and its principal partners — UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme.

44. Given the immense logistical challenges and the need for effective coordination with the multitude of players involved in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration exercise, I intend to appoint to MONUC a second Deputy Special Representative to be responsible for operations and management, including all support aspects of the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme. My first Deputy Special Representative will, in addition to her other functions, retain responsibility for political guidance on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration. She will also, as noted in paragraph 9 above, be my senior representative in the third-party verification mechanism.

45. A forward Mission headquarters, to be directed by a senior civilian officer, will be established at Kisangani, in order to coordinate MONUC activities in the east and to spearhead disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration in this region. The creation of such a forward Mission headquarters will enable MONUC to shift the "centre of gravity" of its activities gradually towards the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo as the Mission embarks on its phase III activities.

46. In the meantime, MONUC offices in Kampala and Kigali will also be strengthened to support the work of the Mission, especially in the implementation of the Pretoria and Luanda Agreements, and to provide better political liaison and analysis of developments in Uganda and Rwanda. MONUC also expects to establish a field presence in Lubumbashi.

47. International monitoring of the returning ex-combatants and dependants in Rwanda is an essential confidence-building measure. It is envisaged that UNHCR will undertake its normal monitoring

functions in relation to returning refugees. At the same time, discussions are under way to identify the most effective way to monitor ex-combatants who are repatriated through “solidarity camps” before they are returned to their communities of origin. The experience in Kamina has demonstrated that confidence-building measures are necessary to ensure that ex-combatants can benefit from the security guarantees extended by the Rwandan Government.

Concept of operations

48. In order to support the conduct of disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation of foreign armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the military component of MONUC will need to be significantly strengthened by creating a forward force. The forward force will comprise two robust task forces, based in Kindu and Kisangani, as well as one reserve battalion, riverine units and specialized enabling units to enhance the Mission’s military logistics capacity.

49. Each task force will be an integrated (i.e., including command, combat and support elements) and flexible force of approximately 1,700 troops with in-built mobility, structured around a well-equipped infantry battalion. It will also be supported by integral utility (transport) aviation with a lift capability of 120 personnel, specialized logistics elements and two military engineer units, each with a limited demining and construction capability. Additionally, a single armed helicopter unit will be deployed in the east to support the forward force. While the two task forces will maintain their primary bases in Kindu and Kisangani, each one will have the capability to deploy forward up to three company groups to mobile disarmament and demobilization sites in the east.

50. The task forces will, inter alia, provide “point security” at disarmament and demobilization sites for the conduct of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, support the engineering preparation of disarmament and demobilization sites, destroy weapons and munitions, and provide limited demining capability.

51. A force reserve battalion, provided by a single troop-contributing country, will comprise a headquarters and four infantry companies. This reserve battalion will be located at Kisangani and will provide flexibility and the ability to meet unexpected contingencies. It may also assist specialized civilian

and military teams with ad hoc disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration operations carried out in the west of the country, as a prelude to the wider disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration operation.

52. It is proposed that airfield services be provided by the military component, aimed at enabling MONUC to quickly expand its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations. These will include essential capabilities in areas such as meteorology, air traffic control, movement control and cargo-handling support that are necessary to ensure flexible, safe and reliable airfield operations.

53. The riverine units will be used to support the reopening of the Congo River for commercial traffic and the movement of United Nations transports, as well as to facilitate MONUC monitoring in the area south-east of Kisangani. Additional military observers are also envisaged to staff the military component of the forward Mission headquarters in Kisangani and to support broader phase III tasks, including by assisting in the screening of combatants in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercise.

54. The current military deployment of MONUC comprises approximately 640 military observers and 3,600 troops. To undertake the tasks described above in the revised concept of operations, an additional 120 military observers and up to 4,340 troops will be necessary, bringing the total authorized strength to 8,700 military personnel. The overall troop requirement will be kept under close review, especially with regard to tasks undertaken under the earlier phase II deployment. As discussed in paragraph 48 above, the new military requirements for the Mission include essential military logistics capabilities. It should be noted, however, that in the past it has been extremely difficult for the United Nations to obtain such troops from Member States. If they are not made available, specialized civilian contracts will have to be sought. Such contracts are usually very costly and may be very slow to materialize.

C. Withdrawal of foreign troops

55. MONUC will continue to monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which remains a key element of an overall

settlement. The Mission has observed the recent withdrawal of Ugandan troops from Beni and Gbadolite and is also currently monitoring the redeployment of Zimbabwean troops to assembly areas, in preparation for their withdrawal from Democratic Republic of the Congo territory. MONUC has recently observed the repatriation of a number of Zimbabwe Defence Forces troops from the area of Mbandaka and Mbuji-Mayi. A MONUC military liaison officer is present in Zimbabwe to monitor the arrival of withdrawing Zimbabwean troops in the country.

56. MONUC will also be prepared to monitor the withdrawal of Rwandan troops, the largest foreign military presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1304 (2000) and subsequent resolutions. It is hoped that the third-party verification mechanism will be able to assist in this process. In the meantime, the initial withdrawal plan provided by the Rwandan Government lacks some specific information that is required, including information on the numbers, equipment and locations of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) units in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as their exit routes. A timetable for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops should also be developed and promptly submitted to the third-party verification mechanism. Once the necessary information is made available, MONUC will develop its own plan to monitor the withdrawal of the RPA troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

D. Restoring security in the north-east

57. The currently explosive situation in Bunia calls for intensified efforts by the parties and the international community to defuse the tension and to urgently inject a sense of normalcy. It is envisaged that the response of MONUC will be twofold: promoting accountability from the de facto authorities and launching measures to build confidence between the communities.

58. Given the prevailing volatile environment, security responsibilities should continue to be discharged by UPDF, in an impartial manner, until such time as it can be replaced by a capable police force representing a legitimate authority acceptable to the communities in Ituri. In due course, once an agreement on the installation of a new administration in Ituri is reached, further consideration could be given to

MONUC providing police training and monitoring assistance in this region. It is also important that external players refrain from exploiting the precarious situation in Ituri.

59. In view of the pervasive fear and mistrust that characterize relations between the Lendu and the Hema, it is essential that a dialogue between the two groups, as well as with the wider community of Ituri be initiated and maintained. In the past, the organization of forums and round tables involving community leaders and traditional chiefs has helped defuse tensions. However, the lack of follow-up or the non-implementation of agreed measures has impeded the furtherance of reconciliation efforts.

60. Pursuant to the Luanda Agreement, the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda are envisaged to establish a Joint Pacification Committee on Ituri (see para. 16 above). MONUC will work with the two Governments and with key personalities on the ground on the proposed initiative, with a view to assisting them in the search for a solution to the troubling situation in Ituri.

61. In the meantime, MONUC intends to increase its presence in Bunia, with a senior political adviser leading the team there. The team will collect and analyse information on trends that are likely to have an effect on the security environment. To this end, MONUC has already strengthened its office in the area by dispatching a political officer, a civil affairs officer and a humanitarian officer to Bunia. However, sustaining a large MONUC civilian presence in Ituri requires that all concerned urgently address the security situation.

62. An important factor contributing to the highly volatile environment in Ituri is the lack of access to objective and impartial information, making the population susceptible to manipulation and, sometimes, incitement by those who want to destabilize the situation. MONUC will do its best to intensify its public information efforts in Bunia, and has already made arrangements to install a Radio Okapi transmitter there.

63. It is widely felt that a small number of leaders are responsible for deliberately creating a confused situation in the Ituri region, pitting one community against another, to further their own interests. In order to end the cycle of violence in an environment of

impunity, these leaders should be held accountable for their actions.

E. Civilian police aspects

64. It will be recalled that the idea of establishing a civilian police component in MONUC was first broached in my eighth report on MONUC (S/2001/572), in the context of assisting local authorities to enhance their capacity to maintain law and order in areas from which foreign forces would withdraw and disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration would take place. Under resolution 1355 (2001) of 15 June 2001, the Security Council approved the establishment of a civilian police component in MONUC to conduct an in-depth assessment of policing institutions, needs and capabilities, and ultimately to prepare recommendations for an eventually expanded MONUC civilian police component. The task of the civilian police component was to advise and assist the local authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities to ensure the security of the local population, particularly in regard to the internal security situation following the withdrawal of the foreign forces.

65. With the signing of the Pretoria and Luanda Agreements, MONUC has been considering in more concrete terms the type of assistance the Mission could provide in areas from which RPA and UPDF troops would withdraw. As the situation in these areas becomes clearer in the coming months, I intend to return to the Security Council with recommendations regarding the assistance MONUC could provide in relation to capacity-building for local internal security mechanisms — including broader law and order issues, such as human rights and the judiciary.

V. Observations and recommendations

66. The signing of two separate bilateral Agreements between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda is an extremely important development in the Democratic Republic of the Congo peace process, and could be a major step forward in the continuing efforts to end a long-standing conflict. The highly commendable initiatives of the Governments of South Africa and Angola to introduce a new dynamic in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo peace process deserve our strong support. It is important that the parties on the ground now demonstrate their full commitment to these Agreements through concrete and decisive steps.

67. In this connection, the reports of intensified military activities in the east are a source of major concern. I call on the parties to do everything possible to achieve an immediate ceasefire and to end all support to the armed groups, as a sign of good will. I also call on all concerned — in particular RCD-National, supported by MLC, and RCD-K/ML — to cease all military activities in the north-east. The gap that still exists between the increasingly positive diplomatic efforts and the deteriorating situation on the ground must not be allowed to widen.

68. I am particularly concerned about the security conditions in the Ituri region. The tensions between the local communities have been aggravated by the dynamics affecting the larger Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict. I call on all concerned not to take any action that might exacerbate existing tensions. The developments in Ituri underscore the pressing need to arrive at an all-inclusive agreement on a transitional Government that could promptly extend its authority effectively throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

69. In the framework of the Luanda Agreement, I urge the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda to continue their consultations, with a view to addressing the troubling situation in Ituri and, in particular, ensuring that there is no security vacuum in the region. In this connection, their decision to establish a Joint Pacification Committee on Ituri is a welcome development.

70. The efforts of humanitarian agencies to meet the vast needs in that region and elsewhere in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are vital. Humanitarian agencies have recently established a task force on the situation in Ituri in order to closely monitor developments and to coordinate an effective response. However, the needs are overwhelming and cannot be met with current resources alone. I strongly appeal to donors to provide generous funding to the humanitarian agencies operating in the area. Their work also requires adequate security arrangements, and all parties in the Ituri region are urged to allow the

humanitarian agencies full and complete access to all those in need.

71. The Pretoria and Luanda Agreements have laid a foundation for building a lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They address the main aspects of the conflict by providing a framework for the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of foreign armed groups and for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign troops. The repatriation of UPDF from Beni and Gbadolite, which paves the way for Uganda's total withdrawal from Democratic Republic of the Congo territory, is an important step forward. While Zimbabwe is not a party to the Pretoria Agreement or the Luanda Agreement, the recent announcement of its intention to repatriate its troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo is also a welcome step. I call on the Government of Zimbabwe to work closely with MONUC to ensure that its withdrawal is conducted in a transparent and orderly manner. Rwanda should also demonstrate its willingness to withdraw its troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions.

72. There should be no doubt that the ability of MONUC to implement its revised concept of operations will depend on the full cooperation of the parties, which includes the provision of all necessary information; a full cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular of the fighting between the non-signatories to the Lusaka Agreement and the Rwandan/RCD-Goma forces; the cessation of support from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its allies for ex-FAR/Interahamwe and other armed groups; and the parties' provision of security, access and freedom of movement to MONUC.

73. It is my sincere hope that the obstacles that have impeded the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in the past will be overcome through the third-party verification mechanism. MONUC will extend its fullest cooperation to the verification mechanism, and will report on the possible financial implications.

74. The effective conduct of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of foreign armed groups will be imperative for the settling of the Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict. On the basis of lessons learned

in similar situations, the delays usually caused by a shortage of funds provided on a voluntary basis must be avoided. The international community cannot afford to miss the opportunity offered by the Pretoria Agreement to disarm, demobilize and repatriate foreign armed groups — a goal that has been pursued for several years now. It is therefore recommended that the costs of disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of members of armed groups be borne under the assessed budget. At the same time, I intend to do everything possible to encourage donors to mobilize funds for this process on a voluntary basis, with a view to reimbursing the assessed budget allocations. In addition, any costs related to reintegration would continue to be funded through voluntary contributions to Governments and agencies concerned. I call on the international community to support these efforts generously, particularly through assistance to the communities where the ex-combatants will resettle.

75. In this context, I would also like to recommend an extension of quick-impact project funding for MONUC, which is absolutely essential as the Mission enters a new phase of its mandate and expands its deployment and visibility. Such projects, while representing a very small percentage of the Mission's overall budget, can go a long way in helping the Mission to provide tangible benefits to the communities where it is deployed and in winning the support of the local population.

76. While it is clear that the implementation of the Agreements will depend primarily on the political will and determination of the parties to abide by their commitments, much remains to be done by the international community in assisting the parties to implement their undertakings. In this regard, an adjustment and reconfiguration of the MONUC structure and deployment has been carefully considered in order to determine how the Mission can most effectively play its role in support of the peace process. Consequently, it is proposed that MONUC shift the emphasis of its activity eastward, enhance its disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration capacity and strengthen its presence considerably, essentially through the deployment of two task forces, as outlined in paragraphs 48 to 54 above.

77. Accordingly, I recommend that the authorized military strength of MONUC be increased up to 8,700 all ranks, bearing in mind that the troop level will be

kept under constant review as the process unfolds. In anticipation of a Security Council decision and in order to ensure an expeditious response by the United Nations, I have instructed the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to step up its efforts to consult potential troop contributors. In this connection, I particularly appeal to countries that have the capability to provide specialized military units, such as military aviation units, airfield services and engineers, to contribute to MONUC.

78. I strongly urge the Congolese parties to reach an all-inclusive agreement on a new political dispensation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as soon as possible. My Special Envoy, Mr. Niasse, will continue to work closely with the Congolese leaders to reach this very important goal. Any delay in achieving such a political settlement could undermine the recent momentum created by the Pretoria and Luanda Agreements.

79. As noted in the Pretoria Agreement, the resolution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict is a process, not an event. Therefore, the signing of the recent Agreements — while an important step towards peace — is only the beginning of a process, the progress of which will depend, first, on the commitment of the parties and, second, on the decisive support that the international community will be willing to provide.
